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THE NEXT ERA OF SENTENCING REFORM
Steven L. Chanenson∗
Criminal sentencing is in turmoil. The Supreme Court has revealed a new
understanding of the Sixth Amendment. The very foundation of many
sentencing schemes now seems unstable. Yet, we still have the ability to craft
a rational, balanced approach to sentencing. The rules may have changed, but
the game is the same, and it is winnable.
In Blakely v. Washington,1 the U.S. Supreme Court delivered a legal
haymaker that has sent the criminal sentencing world reeling. The Court had
previously held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find all facts
(other than the existence of a prior conviction) that increase the statutory
maximum punishment.2 Blakely concluded that the tops of Washington State’s
sentencing guideline ranges are themselves so-called “statutory maxima,”
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1 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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which under the Sixth Amendment can only be transcended based on a jury’s
factual finding or a defendant’s admission of an aggravating factor.3
Before Blakely, several states and the federal government supplied structure
or guidance, often in the form of sentencing guidelines, for judges imposing
criminal sentences. To varying degrees, these guidelines systems relied on
facts that the judges found by a preponderance of the evidence, a procedure the
Supreme Court had approved time and again.4 Many guidelines schemes
provided presumptive sentencing ranges for typical cases. The top of the
presumptive range was below the traditional statutory maximum for the
offense of conviction. The actual sentence imposed might be higher or lower
than the presumptive range, in part because of judicially found aggravating or
mitigating facts. Blakely effectively invalidated key aspects of several
sentencing systems because these systems permitted judges to impose
sentences higher than the presumptive guideline range based on facts found by
the judge, using the preponderance of the evidence standard, instead of by the
jury, using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.5
In the words of the Ninth Circuit, Blakely “worked a sea change in the body
of sentencing law.”6 Many states are struggling to determine what parts of
their systems survived Blakely and how they should respond. Because Blakely
concerned a sentence from Washington State—where the legislature directly
passed the sentencing guidelines—the case did not squarely resolve the fate of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,7 which are largely a creature of rulemaking

3

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
E.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (concerning acquitted conduct that
a judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, actually took place). Arguably, however, the Supreme
Court had never before squarely addressed the issue of judicial factfinding in the context of a Sixth
Amendment challenge.
5 See, e.g., Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington Practical
Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 60, 60 (2004) (noting that several states
“employ presumptive sentencing guidelines systems that enable judges to enhance sentences by finding
aggravating facts, as does the Washington system addressed by the Court” in Blakely); id. at 61 (“It is evident
that the four other states . . . with presumptive sentencing guidelines systems—Minnesota, North Carolina,
Oregon, and Tennessee—will be affected by the decision to the same extent as Washington.”); Impact of
Blakely v. Washington on Tennessee’s Sentencing Scheme, 04-131 Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 2 (2004) (“While
Tennessee’s sentencing scheme differs in certain respects from the Washington guideline sentencing scheme at
issue in Blakely, the differences do not appear to be constitutionally significant.”).
6 United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).
7 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion
on them.”).
4
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by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.8 In the months immediately after
Blakely, federal courts divided over the constitutionality of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines,9 inducing the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari
and expedite argument in United States v. Booker and United States v.
Fanfan.10 Meanwhile, chaos reigned in many state and federal courts across
the land.
Regardless of what the Supreme Court decides in Booker and Fanfan,
Blakely presents legislatures, courts, and sentencing commissions with an
opportunity to re-examine and improve their sentencing systems. As such,
Blakely can be a lever or a tool to advance the law. We have a natural opening
to ask ourselves what sort of a sentencing system we should have. Which
actors should posses what kind and degree of discretion? This is an
opportunity many legislatures appear determined to take. For example,
Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, seems
poised to take federal legislative action regardless of the Supreme Court’s
decisions.11 With the ferment of sentencing reform in the air, now may be the
time not only to revamp the sentencing systems Blakely has damaged or
destroyed, but to usher in the next era of sentencing reform as well.12
Yet are alternatives available?
The Blakely dissenters predicted
“disastrous” consequences and the destruction of almost a quarter century of
progress.13 For example, Justice O’Connor lamented that “[o]ver 20 years of

8 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not exclusively reflect an administrative nature. See Steven L.
Chanenson, Hoist with Their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 20 (2004) (showing how the PROTECT Act
undermined the administrative nature of the federal Guidelines and may lead to the guidelines’ demise postBlakely).
9 Compare United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 515 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding federal guidelines
unconstitutional), with United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding federal guidelines
constitutional). As time went on and the Supreme Court agreed to resolve whether Blakely applied to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, more and more federal courts of appeals decided to keep applying the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines even though many people believe that the Supreme Court will ultimately conclude that
Blakely damages or destroys that system.
10 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004).
11 See 108 CONG. REC. S8572 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“As we go forward, I
believe we should adopt legislation that would render the Federal sentencing guidelines constitutional
regardless of whether Blakely applies [to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.]”).
12 This is particularly important in the roughly one-half of all states that still use largely unguided,
indeterminate sentencing. See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information
Systems, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 121, 121 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Wool & Stemen, supra note
5, at 67.
13 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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sentencing reform are all but lost.”14 Not only is Justice O’Connor
overreacting, but she may be fundamentally wrong. All is most assuredly not
lost. In fact, history’s verdict on Blakely may be kind if legislatures seize the
opportunity before them.
Viable options exist. The choices that have already begun to percolate to
the top of the legislative, judicial, and academic agendas include fully advisory
guidelines, boundless guidelines, inverted guidelines, and guidelines with
extended jury factfinding.15 While no sentencing system is perfect, each of
these popular contenders has substantial drawbacks that outweigh their
advantages.
I offer a different way to approach sentencing. Capitalizing on the window
of opportunity afforded by Blakely, we can devise a better sentencing system
by remembering some core principles that have animated modern sentencing
reform. Legislatures should adopt what I call “Indeterminate Structured
Sentencing” (“ISS”), an indeterminate sentencing system (that is, a system that
includes discretionary parole release authority) in which a Super Commission
promulgates two sets of coordinated guidelines that constrain both sentencing
and release powers. This balanced approach rejects both extremely uniform
sentences and extremely individualized sentences while pursuing relative
proportionality in a Blakely-compliant way.
An ISS system respects judicial sentencing judgment while also
acknowledging the value of structural checks and balances. It permits severe
sentences when judges believe them appropriate but also limits the pressure to
increase sentences across the board. Although the ISS model draws on aspects
of various sentencing systems, it is a distinctive hybrid approach. ISS
sentencing guidelines channel a judge’s decisional authority while preserving
important nodes of judicial discretion. Through its parole release guidelines,
ISS encourages the predictable exercise of discretionary, yet modestly
conceived, parole release authority.
Nevertheless, ISS parole release
guidelines allow for departures when appropriate, and provide for some form
of appellate review. Thus, ISS satisfies Blakely while simultaneously
increasing practicality and justice.

14 Id. at 2550. Also in dissent, Justice Kennedy contended that the majority “disregard[ed] the
fundamental principle under our constitutional system that different branches of government ‘converse with
each other on matters of vital common interest.’” Id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 157–249.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the fundamental
elements of sentencing. It hones sentencing’s common language and presents
tools for evaluating competing sentencing systems. Part II demonstrates how
Blakely has created both short-term chaos and long-term opportunities for
sentencing reform. Part III evaluates four popular possibilities for sentencing
systems after Blakely, and finds them all suffering from significant limitations.
These flaws range from too much judicial discretion, which can invite
invidious disparity, to too little judicial discretion, which can result in
unwarranted uniformity. Each of these possibilities fails to provide sufficient
assurances that a resulting sentence is likely to be relatively proportional to the
crime and criminal involved. Finally, Part IV introduces the new ISS model.
An ISS system affords greater confidence that sentences will be fair and just
and provides a workable balance between uniformity and individualization
while effectively pursuing relative proportionality.
I. FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF SENTENCING
To understand what Blakely has done and to see how the various state and
federal sentencing systems could or should respond, this Article employs a
common language to describe these systems and crafts a functional model to
evaluate them. Armed with those tools of common language and evaluation, it
is possible to understand the broad historical contours of American sentencing
that set the stage for Blakely.
A. A Common Descriptive Language
To discuss sentencing systems effectively, a common descriptive language
is essential. Even though a common sentencing language exists,16 it is often
badly mangled. Sentencing systems frequently bear the label of “determinate”
or “indeterminate.” Too frequently, however, courts and commentators apply
those terms imprecisely or improperly, leading to confusion. This problem,
which apparently has been brewing for some time,17 has become more acute in

16 See, e.g., Richard Singer, In Favor of “Presumptive Sentences” Set by a Sentencing Commission, 24
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 401, 403–06 (1978).
17 See, e.g., Marguerite A. Driessen & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Sentencing Dissonances in the United
States: The Shrinking Distance Between Punishment Proposed and Sanction Served, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 623,
634 (2002) (referring, incorrectly, to “determinate, or structured, sentencing”). The perils of this definitional
imprecision are highlighted within this same article when the authors appropriately describe Utah’s efforts to
provide some guidance for its indeterminate sentencing system. Id. at 638–39 (noting that “Utah has made
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the immediate aftermath of Blakely.18 Arguably, even the Supreme Court in
Blakely deployed the terminology imprecisely.19 It need not nor should not be
that way. We need once again to sharpen our terms.20
The key difference between indeterminate and determinate sentencing
systems is uncomplicated. Indeterminate systems use discretionary parole
some reforms that nod in the direction of structured sentencing without changing its essential sentencing
scheme, which provides for indeterminate sentencing”).
18 E.g., United States v. Hakley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15784, at *21 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2004)
(displaying an incorrect understanding of “indeterminate” sentencing); United States v. Agett, 327 F. Supp. 2d
899, 906 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); United States v. Sisson, 326 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D. Mass. 2004)
(finding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional in light of Blakely and erroneously describing the
Court’s “return to an indeterminate sentencing scheme” when the context indicates that the court will employ a
discretionary, determinate sentencing system and apparently treat the Guidelines as fully voluntary); United
States v. Lockett, 325 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677–78 (E.D. Va. 2004); cf. Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong., available at 2004 WL 1571026 (July
13, 2004) (statement of Paul G. Cassell) (describing post-Blakely practice of Western District of Texas Judge
as being “indeterminate,” although context indicates an unguided, discretionary, determinate approach). Some
courts have employed the proper terminology. E.g., United States v. Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 (D.
Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (observing that “there is a problem with reinstituting an indeterminate system, when
there is no longer parole”).
Unfortunately, at least one sentencing scholar has intentionally decided to use “indeterminate” and
“unstructured” interchangeably. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2468 n.12 (2004). In his otherwise excellent article, Professor Bibas states:
The term “indeterminate sentences” used to refer to broad ranges set by judges (for example, five
to ten years). Within these broad ranges, parole boards often determined the ultimate release
dates. Determinate sentences, in contrast, were precise sentences set by judges (for example,
eight years). In more modern parlance, indeterminate sentencing allows judges to set sentences
anywhere below the statutory maxima (for example, anywhere from zero to twenty years for
armed robbery). Determinate sentencing, in contrast, uses sentencing guidelines or statutes (such
as mandatory minima) to guide or constrain judicial discretion within the statutory ranges. This
Article uses the more modern parlance. In other words, I use “indeterminate” to mean unfettered
judicial discretion up to the statutory maxima and “determinate” to mean judicial discretion
constrained by sentencing guidelines or mandatory minima.
Id. The use of this shorthand approach promotes confusion in both the academic literature and the case law.
Furthermore, it ignores that approximately half of American jurisdictions actually maintain an indeterminate
sentencing system—some guided or structured and others not. Cf. Michael Tonry, Reconsidering
Indeterminate and Structured Sentencing, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS, Sept. 1999, at 3 (noting that
indeterminate sentencing “remains the majority approach”). Particularly after Blakely, the distinction between
a true indeterminate and a true determinate sentencing systems matters. While precision frequently eludes us
all, it is easy enough to use more precise words like “structured” or “guided” to mean judicial discretion
restricted, guided, or channeled by some form of sentencing guidelines or rules.
19 See, e.g., Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 60 n.7.
20 My concern about the misuse of these terms—a transgression of which I have also been guilty—stems
largely from my experience with Pennsylvania’s guided, discretionary, indeterminate sentencing system and
the increased national importance of precise terminology post-Blakely. My understanding and discussion of
these concepts draws heavily from Professor Richard Singer’s work. See Singer, supra note 16, at 403–06.
More than twenty-five years ago, Professor Singer provided a clear exposition of the core terms. See id.
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release while determinate systems do not.21 Determinate and indeterminate
sentencing schemes can take various forms. Either sort of system may be
discretionary or nondiscretionary. Discretionary systems—be they determinate
or indeterminate—may be guided or unguided.22 “Guided” or “unguided”
systems may also be referred to as “structured” or “unstructured.”23
In setting a determinate sentence, a judge announces a particular length of
sentence in a system that does not have parole release but may offer other
sentence reductions. “A determinate sentence is simply a sentence for a
specified length of years. It does not necessarily indicate that the offender will
serve all of those years.”24 Through the award of so-called good time or
earned time, a jurisdiction employing a determinate sentencing regime may
release a defendant before the expiration of the announced sentence.25 If there
is no possible reduction in the time served, the determinate sentence is called a
“flat sentence.”26 “Although a flat sentence must always be determinate, not
all determinate sentences . . . are flat.”27 In fact, many jurisdictions with
determinate sentencing systems have nonflat sentences because they offer
some degree of good time or earned time reductions in time served.28
21 E.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 46 (1974) (“If the judge determines that a
prison sentence is appropriate, then the most usual practice in this country is that he will impose a minimummaximum term, an indefinite or indeterminate sentence, with the boundaries more or less precisely defined
. . . .”); Singer, supra note 16, at 404; Tonry, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s
“key” to distinguishing between determinate and indeterminate “systems was whether parole release remained
available for a sizable fraction of cases”); Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61 (defining determinate
sentencing as “a system in which there is no discretionary releasing authority and an offender may be released
from prison only after expiration of the sentence imposed (less available good or earned time)”); id. at 64
(referring to the discretionary parole release authority as the “hallmark of indeterminate sentencing”).
22 E.g., id. at 61.
23 See, e.g., id. (defining a structured sentencing system as “a system providing some form of
recommended sentences within statutory sentence ranges”). Thus, a structured sentencing system need not
have sentencing guidelines as commonly envisioned.
24 Singer, supra note 16, at 404.
25 See, e.g., Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61.
26 Singer, supra note 16, at 404. Flat sentences also assume no possible increase in time served beyond
the sentence imposed. A true flat sentence requires the defendant to be incarcerated for the precise amount of
time stated by the judge. Id. (“A flat sentence of five years would mean that the defendant would serve no
more and no less than five years in prison . . . . No variations in the sentence imposed by the judge are
possible.”).
27 Id.
28 For example, the federal system—at least pre-Blakely—was largely a guided, discretionary, nonflat,
determinate system because it offered up to approximately 15% off for good behavior for all (nonlife)
sentences greater than one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2000) (allowing credit of up to fifty-four days
per year if an inmate displays “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations”). With
respect to sentences for less than one year, it was a guided, discretionary, flat, determinate system because it
offered no good time reductions. Id.; see also United States v. Crecelius, 751 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.R.I.
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A determinate system may be discretionary or nondiscretionary. A
discretionary, determinate system allows a judge to pick the actual sentence
(one number, such as ten years) from a statutory range of punishments. In a
nondiscretionary, determinate system, the legislature specifies the actual
sentence (again one number, such as ten years) that the judge must impose for
the offense of conviction.29
Finally, a discretionary, determinate system may also be guided or
unguided. Unguided systems were the dominant sentencing approach in the
years leading up to the advent of the sentencing guidelines reform movement.30
Judges could largely exercise their discretion as they saw fit. One major result
of the modern sentencing guidelines reform movement has been the
introduction of varying degrees of guidance to discretionary sentencing
systems.
Sentencing guidelines reflect a common way to provide guidance in
discretionary, determinate sentencing systems. In broad strokes, sentencing
guidelines can be either “presumptive” or “voluntary,” although there can be
many variations under these labels. Presumptive sentencing guidelines require
judges to follow the guidelines’ sentencing recommendations or justify their
deviation from them.31 Legislatures often authorize appellate judicial review
to enforce these guidelines. Fully voluntary guidelines, in contrast, are true
recommendations; they rely on reason and moral suasion to encourage
compliance.32

1990) (noting that a sentence of a year and a day can be functionally shorter than a sentence of a year because
of the availability of good time credits).
29 Singer, supra note 16, at 404.
30 Most of those systems, however, were indeterminate.
31 E.g., Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61.
32 Id. at 61, 66. There are, of course, systems that are not easy to categorize as either presumptive or
voluntary.

CHANENSON GALLEYS7

2005]

4/21/2005 10:00 AM

THE NEXT ERA OF SENTENCING REFORM

385

The critical distinguishing factor for indeterminate sentencing is the
existence of discretionary parole release.33 Jon Wool and Don Stemen of the
Vera Institute of Justice define an indeterminate sentencing system as one
in which a discretionary releasing authority, such as a parole board,
may release an offender from prison prior to expiration of the
sentence imposed. It may also, but need not, allow judges to impose
a sentence range, such as three-to-six years, rather than a specific
34
period of time to be served.

In one approach to indeterminate sentencing, the parole board may release the
defendant no earlier than the lower number in the range and no later than the
higher number in the range. This approach to indeterminate sentencing,
including a sentence range, will provide the best opportunity for reform in the
post-Blakely world.
As with determinate sentencing, indeterminate sentencing may be
discretionary or nondiscretionary. The discretionary approach, reflected in the
classic, indeterminate scheme, allows a judge to pick a sentencing range
anywhere within the statutorily authorized spectrum of punishments. For
example, the legislature may have determined that robbers may be sentenced
anywhere from probation to twenty years in prison. The judge could then
choose an indeterminate sentence within that wide span. The nondiscretionary
approach may involve the legislature setting an indeterminate range that the
judge must impose based on the conviction offense.35
33 This is consistent with the definition provided in the U.S. Code for purposes of truth-in-sentencing
grants. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2000) provides:

(1) the term “indeterminate sentencing” means a system by which—
(A) the court may impose a sentence of a range defined by statute; and
(B) an administrative agency, generally the parole board, or the court, controls release within
the statutory range.
34 Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61. It is also possible to have indeterminate sentencing with the
judge just deciding whether to incarcerate the defendant and the parole board setting the sentence served later.
E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 161 (1993).
35 Singer, supra note 16, at 405 (“For example, the judge must impose the statutorily mandated
indeterminate scheme, such as zero to three years. Paroling and correctional authorities determine release
time, but the only sentence available to the judge is zero to three years.”). A different, nondiscretionary,
indeterminate system could involve a judge being able to impose only one sentence of incarceration (the
maximum) with earlier release at the discretion of the paroling authority. See State v. Rivera, 2004 WL
2955940, at *10 (Haw. Dec. 22, 2004) (“An indeterminate sentence is ‘[a] sentence to imprisonment for the
maximum period defined by law, subject to termination by the parole board or other [authorized] agency at
any time after service of the minimum period’ ordinarily set by the paroling authority.”) (quoting BLACK’S
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Finally, consistent with determinate sentencing schemes, discretionary,
indeterminate sentencing systems may be guided or unguided. The classic
indeterminate sentencing approach was unguided and discretionary. Within
the wide expanse of statutorily authorized punishments, the judge could
impose a sentencing range based completely on her own discretion and sense
of justice. However, another option is available: There can be a guided,
discretionary, indeterminate sentencing system. Under this approach, used in
states such as Michigan and Pennsylvania, a commission or legislature
provides sentencing guidelines for setting the minimum of the indeterminate
sentencing range. Regardless, the paroling authority decides when to actually
release the defendant.
Thus, sentencing systems can be broken down into two broad camps:
determinate and indeterminate. Within those categories, however, extensive
variation remains. Either approach may be discretionary or nondiscretionary.
Discretionary schemes—determinate or indeterminate—may also be guided or
unguided. Of course, degrees of discretion and guidance can also vary
widely.36
B. How To Evaluate a Sentencing System: A Map for the Mystified
There is no perfect sentencing system.37 Each approach involves tradeoffs
of various kinds, yet all sentencing systems should have a normative goal of
striving for equilibrium between uniformity and individualization in a way that
is likely to yield a fair and just result. Judges need the genuine ability to
consider “all ethically relevant differences between cases.”38 Sentencing
systems, however, must recognize that “disparities matter, that safeguards
should be created against aberrant and invidious exercises of discretion, that
sentencing . . . should be subject to rules, and that judges should be
accountable for their correct application of sentencing rules by means of
appeals to higher judicial authority.”39

LAW DICTIONARY 911 (4th ed. 1968)).
36 Cf. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 734 (1999) (“[C]hoices about sentencing rules
that once appeared to offer choices of either black or white now appear in shades of gray.”).
37 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 195 (1996) (“No sentencing system will ever be perfect or
free from risks of injustice in individual cases.”).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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Given the complexity of sentencing, it is difficult to make quick and useful
comparisons across systems. Nevertheless, one can identify certain important
features to facilitate that task. I have found two related markers to be helpful
in evaluating sentencing systems. By considering the tradeoff between
uniformity of sentences and individualization of sentences, as well as what I
will call the “proportionality confidence index,” it is possible to get a decent
shorthand view of a particular sentencing system.
The question of uniformity versus individualization is a radically simplified
model of sentencing, although all sentencing systems can be plotted on the
continuum between these two poles. For ease of administration, I will employ
five points on the continuum with the center reflecting the desired balance
between the two extremes. The extreme uniformity side of the model might be
the Code of Hammurabi, which is largely a collection of criminal tariffs,40 or
mandatory (minimum) sentences. As a specific example, in a system of
extreme uniformity all robbers might receive ten years in prison regardless of
their criminal history or personal circumstances. This could be represented
graphically as:41
Extreme
Uniformity

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

40 See, e.g., NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 88 (2004) (“Sentences
dominated by legislative choices go back to some of the earliest recorded sources of law, including the Code of
Hammurabi . . . .”); id. (providing examples from the Code, including “Section 196: If a man has caused the
loss of a gentleman’s eye, his eye one shall cause to be lost”).
41 There are other ways to map out sentencing systems. See, e.g., Mark W. Osler, Written Testimony of
Mark W. Osler Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://sentencing.type
pad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/written_testimony_of_mark_w.%20Osler-Final.doc.
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An example of the extreme individualization side of the model is a system in
which a judge, acting completely on the basis of her own unguided discretion,
may impose a flat determinate sentence of anywhere from probation to life in
prison for every robber that appears before her. It might be represented
graphically as:
Extreme
Individualization

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

Yet, even as a simplified paradigm, the uniformity versus individualization
model is inadequate; it does not address the likelihood of relative
proportionality. While many highly uniform systems will have a lower
likelihood of relative proportionality than many highly individualized systems,
there is no guarantee of that correlation. As such, we need to consider this
factor separately. More specifically, I will evaluate sentencing schemes based
on what I call the “proportionality confidence index.” The proportionality
confidence index provides a rough measure of the likelihood that specific
sentences will be proportional on a relative scale.42 Again recognizing that this
is a simplified model of very complex sentencing phenomena, I will break the
proportionality confidence index down into just five categories or scores: high,
medium high, medium, medium low, and low.
Most sentencing schemes that reflect an extreme uniformity of sentences
will have a low proportionality confidence index. For example, if all thieves

42 This is only addressing relative proportionality—that is, whether a more serious crime committed by a
more serious criminal is treated more seriously. Cf. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND
COMMUNITY 156 (2001) (“[T]he principle of proportionality is a principle of relative proportionality. . . .
Doing justice to individual offenders is therefore a matter of doing justice between offenders. We punish this
offender justly by ensuring that her sentence is proportionate to her crime, relative to the sentences imposed on
other offenders.”); Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision,
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 596 (2002). The proportionality confidence index does not address questions of
absolute severity.
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receive a sentence of ten years of incarceration regardless of how much money
they stole, why they stole it, or what they did in the past, there is a low chance
that the individual sentences will be relatively proportional. Accordingly, this
system would rate a low score on the proportionality confidence index.
The story is more complicated for sentencing schemes that lean heavily
toward individualization. Individualization does not necessarily equate with
proportionality. In a system of complete individualization in which there is no
guidance for, or review of, a judge’s actions, the result is unlikely to be a high
score on the proportionality confidence index; there is too great an opportunity
for irrational and inconsistent results across cases. However, a moderately—
though not extremely—individualized system may attain a reasonable
proportionality confidence index score through the use of upfront guidance and
appellate review of sentences. Thus, I have separated out the relative
proportionality component.
The combination of the uniformity versus individualization balance and the
proportionality confidence index provides a snapshot of how a sentencing
system operates on the macro level. Certain factors, including the degree of
guidance to the sentencing judge and appellate review, influence these
evaluations. It is important, however, to remember that this is just a model and
that it does not guarantee any specific outcome, certainly not in individual
cases.43
Furthermore, this model does not address questions of absolute severity.
This is an intentional decision. While vitally important, questions of absolute
severity travel independently of the framework of the sentencing system.44 As
43 There are other limitations of the model as well. For example, transparency and accountability are also
key aspects of a good sentencing system. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, Statement at Initial Hearing of the
ABA Justice Kennedy Commission (Nov. 13, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/steve
chanenson1.html (“Our sentencing systems should be able to withstand the closest scrutiny . . . . Openness is a
good in and of itself; more information is better than less.”).
44 My focus here is on relative proportionality. By focusing on relative proportionality, I am attempting
to assess the ability of a sentencing system to order punishments logically. I am assuming that each
jurisdiction will endeavor to achieve absolute proportionality as well, although each jurisdiction’s vision of
that absolute proportionality will no doubt vary. Indeed, tying punishment recommendations to a vision of
absolute proportionality is one of the key recommendations of the American Law Institute’s current draft effort
to revise the sentencing portions of the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i),
§1.02(2)(a) cmt. at 8 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 4) (adopting Norval Morris’s “Limiting Retributivism”
approach and encouraging punishments “within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders”); id. (“Deontological concerns of justice
or ‘desert’ place a ceiling on governments’ legitimate power to attempt to change an offender or otherwise
influence future events.”).
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I have argued elsewhere,
there can and will be future changes—down and up—in the
particular levels of severity for any sentencing system. However, if
those changes occur in the context of a reasonable and logical
sentencing framework, the end results are more likely to reflect
45
fairness and engender greater public confidence.

C. “The Past Is a Foreign Country”46
In order to understand where sentencing systems should go in the postBlakely era, it is important to have a basic understanding of where sentencing
has been. At least by the late nineteenth century, most American jurisdictions
started to move toward increased, but unguided, judicial sentencing discretion.
More recently, many American jurisdictions have experimented with some
form of guided sentencing, typically in the form of sentencing guidelines. To
improve the prospects for the future, we must remember some of the perils of
the past.
1. Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: Tariffs
English punishment in the mid- to late-1700s reflected what might be
referred to as the tariff system.47 In its purest form, each offense yielded a
particular punishment by operation of law.48 Although these punishments were
evaded in various ways, the sentencing judge played little overt substantive
role in determining a defendant’s sentence. A common punishment for various
offenses, ranging from murder to theft, was death.49 This system was
extremely uniform (at least in theory):50

45

Chanenson, supra note 43.
Cf. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 9 (Hamish Hamilton 1978) (1954) (“The past is a foreign
country: they do things differently there.”).
47 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) (“[W]ith respect to the criminal law of felonious
conduct, ‘the English trial judge of the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing.
The substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each
offense.’”) (citation omitted).
48 See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 891 (1990).
49 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 41–44.
50 See id. (discussing the mitigation device to avoid the gallows called “benefit of clergy,” which became
widely available—far beyond its original intention—by about 1700).
46
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Logically, this system fares poorly on the relative proportionality index, rating
a score of low.51
There is a debate among legal scholars as to how much of this general tariff
approach was imported into early America. Some argue that “up through
1870, legislators retained most of the discretionary power over criminal
sentencing. Each crime had a defined punishment . . . .”52 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated that in “the early days of the Republic . . . the period
of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature.
Each crime had a defined punishment.”53 Others contend that since “the
beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide sentencing
discretion.”54

51 As Professor Marc Miller has noted, “Absolute apparent equality can be demonstrably unjust.” Marc
L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 272, 275 (2005).
52 Nagel, supra note 48, at 892; see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED.
SENT. REP. 316, 325 (2004) (discussing 18th century approach which imposed “identical punishments on
defendants who commit their crimes quite differently, and thus fails to provide individual justice”); Susan R.
Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 227
(“The English practice at the time of our nation’s founding was determinate sentencing of those convicted of a
felony offense; there was one possible sentence for each offense, imposed after a jury verdict based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element constituting that offense.”); cf. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 26
(1991) (“Years ago, Congress used tariff sentences in sanctioning broad categories of offenses,” ranging from
homicide to theft); Nagel, supra note 48, at 892 (“Judges were given some sentencing discretion, but only
within ranges that were narrow compared to later developments.”).
53 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978) (citation omitted).
54 KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 9 (1998); see also Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever or
Not To Sever? Why Blakely Requires Action by Congress, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 11, 14 n.39 (2004) (“The
frequent claim that judges had little or no sentencing discretion during the early stages of our nation’s history
is bunk.”).
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2. The Wild West: Unguided, Indeterminate Sentencing
At least by the 1800s, however, some American judges had considerable
sentencing discretion.55 The Supreme Court has recognized that judges started
to possess “broad discretion in sentencing—since the nineteenth century shift
in this country from statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing
judges discretion within a permissible range.”56 Frequently, these systems
were both unguided and indeterminate.57 Expansive, unguided, and largely
unreviewable discretion was the common thread running through many, if not
most, such systems.58 Based on a rehabilitative model of punishment, these
unguided, indeterminate sentencing schemes prized individualization in an
effort to rehabilitate the offender.59 The idea was to incarcerate, and thus work
to rehabilitate, the inmate “until he or she had reformed—which was by
definition an indeterminate time.”60 Despite their noble intentions, these
unguided, indeterminate sentencing schemes presented a host of problems and
inequities.
At least as recently as the mid-1960s, it was difficult to say that there was
much of a “law” of sentencing.61 It was a Wild West of unregulated discretion.
55
56

Cf. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45–46.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000); see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558

(2000).
57 At times, this unguided, indeterminate regime is referred to as “classic,” indeterminate sentencing or
“stereotypical,” indeterminate sentencing. Many of the problems with unguided, indeterminate sentencing
came from the “unguided” aspect, although the indeterminate nature of these systems contributed additional
layers of unfairness and unpredictability through the also often-unguided black box of parole release authority.
This classic indeterminate sentencing approach reigned in the United States for decades. E.g., Douglas
A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 25 (2000) (“For the first three-quarters of the twentieth
century, vast and virtually unlimited discretion was the hallmark of the sentencing enterprise.”); see Grayson,
438 U.S. at 47; TONRY, supra note 37, at 7.
58 E.g., Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines After
Blakely: A Former Commissioner’s Perspective, 2004 BYU L. REV. 935, 939 (“Prior to 1984, federal judges
enjoyed wide discretion in sentencing offenders. A judge could impose any punishment within the statutory
maximum and still stand virtually immune from appellate review.”).
59 See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 48, at 893 (“Concomitant with the theories of prison as a rehabilitative
institution, and justice as aimed at individual restoration, was the development of the then innovative
indeterminate sentence.”).
60 Id. at 894; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 160 (“When a man or woman was convicted of a
crime, the judge should no longer fix the sentence by himself. Rather, the criminal would go to prison for an
indefinite period—until he was ready to be foisted back on the world.”); id. (noting that taken to its extreme
the person might stay in prison for the rest of his life, but that “the indeterminate sentence never went to its
theoretical extreme”).
61 Cf. Rupert N. Cross, Paradoxes in Prison Sentences, 81 LAW Q. REV. 205, 205 (1965) (“Am I not a
professor of law, and have prison sentences really got much to do with law?”).
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Unguided sentencing resulted in a “gross disparity in sentencing, with different
sentences imposed upon similar offenders who have committed similar
offenses by the same judge on different days, different judges on different
days, different judges on the same day, and different judges in different
jurisdictions.”62 There were similar inequities concerning when a particular
defendant was released from prison by the paroling authorities.63 The disparity
that flowed from unguided, indeterminate sentencing schemes “often seem[ed]
tinted with racism, and the studies confirm[ed] this to some degree: Black
offenders receive[d] somewhat longer sentences for the same offenses than
[did] white offenders.”64 The great criminologist and law professor Norval
Morris noted that:
Within this wide discretion left to courts to determine the appropriate
punishments for crime they have failed to develop any agreed
principles or practices and that consequently judicial sentencing lacks
uniformity and equality of application, is considerably capricious,
and can be shown to fit neither the crime nor the criminal . . . . The
individual personality of the judge or magistrate plays too large a part
65
in the assessment of the punishment.

62

Singer, supra note 16, at 402; see also TONRY, supra note 37, at 7 (“Unwarranted disparities,
explicable more in terms of the judge’s personality, beliefs, and background than the offender’s crime or
criminal history, have repeatedly been demonstrated.”) (citation omitted).
63 See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 62
(2004) (discussing how personal preferences of parole board members often determined release behavior and
“often resulted in unwarranted sentencing disparities or racial and gender bias”); id. at 62–63 (noting that
parole release was criticized in part because there was little evidence it reduced recidivism, it was viewed as
unjust to force rehabilitation on them under pain of longer imprisonment, and there was vast, unregulated
discretion in the exercise of parole release authority).
Judges in the federal system had some control over a defendant’s eligibility for parole. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(a)–(b) (repealed 1984). Although the judge could frequently authorize an earlier parole eligibility date,
most courts appeared to require the defendant to serve at least one-third of the imposed sentence (or ten years
of a sentence for more than thirty years or life) before becoming eligible for parole. E.g., United States v.
Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989).
64 Singer, supra note 16, at 402; see also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, rather than reflect legally relevant criteria, these disparities too often were
correlated with constitutionally suspect variables such as race.”) (citations omitted); Nagel, supra note 48, at
895 (“Discretion seemed inextricably linked with discrimination.”). Professor Tonry notes that “[t]here was
substantial gender disparity in indeterminate sentencing—in favor of women. The evidence is unclear on the
causes of racial disparities, but their existence is well documented.” TONRY, supra note 37, at 7 (citations
omitted).
65 Norval Morris, Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 AUSTL. L.J. 186, 186, 188 (1953).
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Professor Morris’s concerns were far from theoretical. One of the most
powerful examples of the unfairness that can flow from unguided sentencing
was described by public defender John Packel as part of a 1976 sentencing
conference held at Villanova University School of Law. Packel described the
“unique sentencing device” employed by Judge Carroll, a state court judge in
Philadelphia, operating under an unguided, indeterminate sentencing scheme:
A defendant would appear before him convicted of a significant,
substantial crime. Judge Carrol[l] used very liberal terms in what he
considered a serious crime. He would order the defendant to stand
up and turn around, and he would tell [the defendant] to count the
number of spectators in the courtroom. And his courtrooms were
invariably packed. The defendants would count the spectators and
Judge Carroll would say, “How many people are in the courtroom?”
The defendant would say “Seventeen.” And the Judge would
say, “That’s your sentence. 8½ to 17 years.”
. . . . [O]ccasionally defendants got wise, like one defendant who
stood up in front of a packed courtroom and counted, and then turned
around and said, “One, your Honor.” The Judge said, “One?” And
the defendant said, “I only see one that counts.” And Judge Carroll
66
said, “Six months to one year.”

As shocking as this vignette is, it was not necessarily unprecedented.67 Given
so much discretion, it is not surprising that judges, as mere mortals, would at
least at times exercise their discretion in unpredictable and irrational ways.68
This unguided, indeterminate approach has both a low score on the
66

INSTITUTE FOR CORRECTIONAL LAW, SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 60–61 (D.W. Dowd ed., 1976).
More famously, Judge Marvin Frankel described a judge who had in advance planned to sentence a
defendant to four years in prison. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 18
(1973). At sentencing, however, the defendant “exoriat[ed] the judge, the ‘kangaroo court’ in which he’d been
tried, and the legal establishment in general.” Id. In response, the judge reported that he “‘listened without
interrupting. Finally, when [the defendant] said he was through, I simply gave the son of a bitch five years
instead of the four.’” Id. Judge Frankel highlighted much of what was wrong with the unguided system by
observing:
67

Would we tolerate an act of Congress penalizing such an outburst by a year in prison? The
question, however rhetorical, misses one truly exquisite note of agony: that the wretch sentenced
by [the judge] never knew, because he was never told, how the fifth year of his term came to be
added.
Id. at 19. Frankel observed further that “every criminal lawyer knows cases in which sentencing judges have
done crazy and horrible things.” Id. at 41.
68 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This system of unguided discretion inevitably
resulted in severe disparities in sentences received and served by defendants committing the same offense and
having similar criminal histories.”).
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proportionality confidence index and an extreme ability to individualize
punishment, as shown below:
Extreme
Individualization

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

Following in Professor Morris’s footsteps, Judge Marvin Frankel launched
a sustained attack on unguided sentencing discretion in his 1973 book Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order. After describing the injustices of an unguided
sentencing system and the unfulfilled aspirations of the rehabilitative model,
Frankel laid out a vision for what has become modern sentencing commissions
and sentencing guidelines, although these have developed in ways he did not
anticipate and may not have approved.69
Many people view the era of unguided sentencing as the “bad old days”
because “improper factors such as race, geography and the predilections of the
sentencing judge could drastically affect the sentence.”70 Spurred on by
Morris, Frankel, and others, many American sentencing systems slowly
yielded to reform.
3. The Last Reform: Sentencing Guidelines
Ushered in by the attacks on unguided sentencing systems, legislative,
judicial, and administrative bodies started to experiment with guidance for
sentencing decisions.71 This guidance often, but not always, took the form of

69 See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE
L.J. 2043 (1992); cf. FRANKEL, supra note 67, at 92–93.
70 108 CONG. REC. S8573 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy referred to
this approach as “fully indeterminate sentencing” and appears to have been referring to the traditional,
unguided, indeterminate sentencing scheme although he did not discuss the perils of parole release authority.
Id.
71 Cf. Miller, supra note 12, at 121 (“Sentencing has undergone more reform over the past several
decades than any other area of criminal justice, and perhaps as much reform as any area of the law.”).
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sentencing guidelines.72 “[O]ne way to describe sentencing reform over the
past half century is that law came to sentencing.”73
By the late-1970s, states took the lead on presumptive sentencing
guidelines with Minnesota and Pennsylvania in the vanguard. In the following
quarter century, several states adopted some form of sentencing guidelines.
These jurisdictions attempted to develop systems with an acceptable amount of
judicial discretion.74 This would prove to be an enduring challenge.
Guidelines systems “all seek to eliminate both actual and perceived
disparities in criminal sentencing by making it more regular and more
transparent.”75 Sentencing guidelines systems approach this common goal
through a wide assortment of methods.76 As noted above, some guidelines
systems are presumptive while others are, to varying degrees, voluntary or
advisory. Some use a permanent sentencing commission; others do not. Some
systems use a grid with offense severity typically traveling along the vertical
axis and criminal history along the horizontal axis; the intersection of those
lines produces the suggested or presumptive sentence or sentencing range.
Some guidelines are more descriptive, simply reflecting pre-guidelines
sentencing practices, while others are more prescriptive, attempting to change
pre-guidelines practices.
However a particular system reaches it, the central point is the suggested or
presumptive sentence or sentencing range. The idea is that judges should
impose a sentence pursuant to these suggestions in the typical case. With
respect to guidelines that are presumptive to at least some degree, the better
approaches retain flexibility.77
Professor Douglas Berman noted that
“reformers believed that sentencing guidelines, by codifying standards which
would direct judges’ sentencing decisions in most but not all cases, could
reduce sentencing disparities and maintain sentencing flexibility, while
72

See, e.g., Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 62–63 (discussing presumptive nonguidelines systems).
Miller, supra note 12, at 121.
74 “Reformers recognized that, to be fair and effective, a sentencing system had to strike an appropriate
balance in the amount of judicial sentencing discretion.” Berman, supra note 57, at 31. Indeed, sentencing
guidelines “were promulgated in order to structure the trial court’s exercise of its sentencing power and to
address disparate sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620 n.2 (Pa. 2002).
75 Brief of Alabama et al. at 1, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632), available
at http://www.dwt.com/pdfs/01-04_BlakelyBriefofAlabama.pdf.
76 E.g., Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 427–28 (2000).
77 By definition, fully voluntary guidelines systems allow flexibility. In fact, a prime concern about fully
voluntary guidelines is that they are too flexible.
73
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promoting the development of principled sentencing law and policy.”78 A key
to realizing this vision is the ability to deviate from the suggested or
presumptive sentencing range through mitigated and aggravated ranges and/or
departures from the guidelines. Departures from the guidelines are an
important judicial power in well-crafted, presumptive guidelines systems.79
Effective departure schemes allow the judge, based on good reason and subject
to traditional appellate review, to deviate from the presumptive sentence when
the facts before the court take the case outside the ordinary circumstances for
which the guidelines were written.80
With varying degrees of success, sentencing guidelines appear to have
reduced unwarranted disparity and brought a degree of rationality to
sentencing.81 No sentencing system is perfect, nor will one ever be.82 As
Professor Richard Frase has aptly noted, “[S]entencing policy is very complex,
requiring compromise and careful balancing of numerous, often-competing
goals.”83 In part by regulating, but not eliminating, judicial discretion, many
state sentencing guidelines systems have produced pleasant results.84
4. Reform that Lost Its Way?: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a guided, discretionary, (largely
nonflat) determinate system. They reflect a fairly rigid form of presumptive
sentencing guidelines. Unlike many state guidelines systems, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are quite complex and detailed. This combination of
rigidity and complexity has contributed to their reputation in many circles as a
“dismal failure.”85

78

Berman, supra note 57, at 35.
“The departure power is designed to address a wide universe of special circumstances, which may call
for small deviations from presumptive penalties in some cases, and dramatic changes in others.” MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.04, at 184 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004).
80 Id. § 7.XX, at 202–03; see also MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II.D, at 24
(2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Guidelines/guide04.doc (“When departing from the
presumptive sentence, a judge must provide written reasons which specify the substantial and compelling
nature of the circumstances, and which demonstrate why the sentence selected in the departure is more
appropriate, reasonable, or equitable than the presumptive sentence.”).
81 E.g., Frase, supra note 76, at 443 (“[G]uidelines systems in a number of states have succeeded in
improving sentencing policy and practice reducing bias and disparity in sentencing . . . .”); id. at 436.
82 Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2560 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]hese systems are
imperfect and they yield far from perfect results.”).
83 Frase, supra note 76, at 436.
84 E.g., id. at 443.
85 Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1992).
79
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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are “not based solely on the
circumstances involved in the actual crime of conviction, and the defendant’s
criminal history.”86 Rather, the total offense level consists of the sum of the
“base offense level,” any relevant “specific offense characteristics,” and any
applicable adjustments.87 The total offense level encompasses “relevant
conduct” as well.88 Relevant conduct includes other acts similar to the offense
of conviction even if the government never charged the defendant with those
acts or the jury acquitted the defendant of those acts; the government need only
prove relevant conduct to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.89 The
specific offense characteristics used to alter the base offense level include such
facts as the amount of money taken, the amount of drugs involved, and the
presence or use of a weapon. Additionally, judges make adjustments for other
facts such as whether the defendant was an organizer or leader of the criminal
activity and whether the defendant accepted responsibility for his actions.90
The end result is the total offense level, which, when paired with the
defendant’s Criminal History Category, effectively produces a presumptive
guideline range.91 This range is on the narrow side. By law, the top of the
range cannot be more than six months or 25% above the bottom of the range,
whichever is higher.92
Typically, a judge must sentence the defendant within that presumptive
guideline range. Currently, under some circumstances, a judge may sentence

86

United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
Id. As noted below, the final sentence may also include departures—up or down—depending on the
circumstances.
88 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2004).
89 E.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (approving judicial consideration
of acquitted conduct if proved by a preponderance of the evidence); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 1B1.3, 6A1.3 (policy statement). Relevant conduct includes:
87

(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of . . . jointly
undertaken criminal activity,
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that
offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense . . . .
Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Under various circumstances, relevant conduct also includes “all acts and omissions . . . that
were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” Id.
§ 1B1.3(a)(2).
90 E.g., id. § 3B1.1, 3E1.1.
91 Id. § 1B1.1.
92 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000). If the bottom of the range is thirty years or more, the top of the range
may be life in prison. Id.
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above or below the applicable guideline range if she concludes that there is an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance “of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines.”93 Many critics believe that, from their inception,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were too rigid and unnecessarily restrictive
of a judge’s ability to depart from the presumptive sentencing range.94
Furthermore, since 2003, a judge’s ability to depart downward from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been sharply restricted both through the
enactment of various exclusions and limitations on kinds of departures and
through the reintroduction of de novo appellate review of such departures.95
Judges may still depart downward, however, on the government’s motion to
reward defendants who cooperate with the government.
The end result is a sentencing guidelines system that is rather inflexible, not
respectful of judicial discretion, and frequently criticized for being overly
harsh and unfair, particularly as it relates to certain narcotics offenses.96 For
example, concerning the lack of flexibility and an emphasis on uniformity,
judges are strongly discouraged from taking into account much about the
defendant’s noncriminal life before the offense in question.97 Concerning
proportionality, critics sometimes point to the fact that the drug guidelines
revolve almost exclusively around the weight of the drugs involved and
provide comparatively limited sentencing relief for those low-level drug
dealers who control virtually nothing in the criminal operation, but through
whose hands large quantities of drugs pass.98

93 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1). Different rules apply for crimes against
children and sexual crimes. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
94 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 57, at 58–59 (“By overly restricting the availability of departures, the
Guidelines’ initial departure jurisprudence created a system that was unduly and harmfully rigid in most
cases.”); Nagel, supra note 48, at 934 (observing that initial federal commission focused “more on making
sentences alike, and less on insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar treatment”); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Excessive Uniformity—And How To Fix It, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 169, 169 (1992) (noting that the
federal “guidelines require undue uniformity by blocking needed differentiation among offenders”).
95 E.g., Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 310 (2003).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (describing federal
sentencing of drug offenders as “draconian”).
97 E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (“Age (including youth) is not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a departure is merited.”); id. § 5H1.11 (“Military, civic, charitable, or public
service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted.”).
98 See, e.g., Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (discussing role of drug weight in base offense level).
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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines prize uniformity to the substantial
exclusion of reasonable individualization and at the cost of relative
proportionality. Graphically represented, they lean heavily toward uniformity:

Significant
Uniformity

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

Relative proportionality has been a recurring problem under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. In part as a consequence of its significant uniformity
and limited departure power, there has been a substantial amount of evasion of
the Guidelines through plea agreements and concealment of facts.99 Because
of these and other problems, including an alleged overemphasis on the amount
of financial loss or drugs involved, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines yield a
score of medium low on the relative proportionality index.
II. THE BLAKELY BLOCKBUSTER
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely is the culmination of several
years of cases that blazed a path toward a new conception of the Sixth
Amendment jury right. Despite Blakely’s blockbuster status, much of this line
of cases started with a footnote.100
99 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 57, at 62 (noting that, while the extent of Guideline circumvention is
disputed, “no one disputes that such evasions through sentencing bargains have impacted a significant number
of cases”); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning
To Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 729 n.177; Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 526, 542 (1992); David N. Yellen, Two Cheers for A
Tale of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569–71 (1992).
100 Although for purposes of this discussion, I point to Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), as the
starting point, there are other options. One top contender that leaps to mind is Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). In that case, the Supreme Court rebuffed a request to treat recidivism as an
“element” of the offense. Id. at 247. Justice Thomas later appeared to regret his vote with the majority in
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In Jones v. United States, the Court interpreted the federal carjacking
statute and found that it actually contained three separate offenses with
different punishments.101 In the process, the Court dropped an important clue
to its future jurisprudence in the now infamous sixth footnote. There, the
Jones Court wrote that “any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”102 The Court did concede that
“[b]ecause our prior cases suggest rather than establish this principle, our
concern about the Government’s reading of the [carjacking] statute [as one
offense with an enhanced penalty that may be found by the judge] rises only to
the level of doubt, not certainty.”103 Yet the Court quickly dispelled any such
doubt.
The following year, the Supreme Court took its suggestion in the Jones
footnote and made it the law of the land. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court concluded that every fact that increases an individual’s
maximum potential sentence—other than the fact of a prior conviction—must
be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.104 Therefore, some argue that
these facts are considered “elements” of the offense.105 Apprendi involved a
New Jersey hate crime provision that increased the statutory maximum from
ten to twenty years if the judge determined that the crime was committed with
the intent to intimidate on the basis of such factors as race or religion.106 The
Supreme Court concluded that the jury needed to decide this fact because it
increased the statutory maximum. In 2002, the Court explicitly extended this
reasoning to the capital context in Ring v. Arizona.107
Almendarez-Torres and sought to overturn it. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500, 518–19 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
101 526 U.S. 227, 229, 243–44 (1999).
102 Id. at 243 n.6.
103 Id.
104 530 U.S. 466, 476, 490 (2000).
105 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 333, 340 (2004).
106 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69.
107 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“The right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be
senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two
years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to
both.”). A jury verdict of guilty under the capital statute at issue in Ring only authorized a maximum
punishment of life in prison. Id. at 597. Additional judicial factfinding of an aggravating factor was required
before the death penalty could be imposed. Id. at 609. Language endorsing this scheme in Apprendi led to
confusion in the lower courts, which the Supreme Court resolved in Ring. See, e.g., People v. Kaczmarek, 741
N.E.2d 1131, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[W]hile it appears Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections
to noncapital, rather than capital, defendants, the [Supreme] Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we
are in no position to second-guess that decision here.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1199 (2004).
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Although the lower federal courts and the state courts confined Apprendi
and its progeny108 to the traditional, legislatively enacted statutory
maximum,109 there was “great speculation among academics, judges, and
lawyers about how far it would go.”110 Would, for example, Apprendi be
extended to, and thus invalidate, determinate sentencing guidelines systems?
The Supreme Court seemed to allay those fears in Harris v. United
States.111 In Harris, a wobbly majority of the Court concluded that Apprendi
did not invalidate mandatory minimum sentencing schemes in which the judge
found the triggering event, such as the presence of a gun, and did so by a
preponderance of the evidence.112 The Harris majority was wobbly because of
Justice Breyer. In Harris, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and joined
selected parts of Justice Kennedy’s lead, and at times majority, opinion.113
Justice Breyer said that he could not “easily distinguish” Apprendi from Harris
“in terms of logic” and thus did not join “the plurality’s opinion insofar as it
finds such a distinction.”114 He went on to observe that “because I believe that
extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums would have adverse practical, as
well as legal, consequences, I cannot yet accept its rule. I therefore join the
Court’s judgment, and I join its opinion to the extent that it holds that Apprendi
does not apply to mandatory minimums.”115
As long as the fact that triggered the mandatory minimum did not increase
the statutory maximum, which many, if not most, courts and commentators
understood to be the maximum punishment available according to the
legislature for the offense of conviction, Apprendi did not require the fact to be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Harris message received by
many, if not most, observers was that presumptive sentencing guidelines with
judicial factfinding did not offend the Sixth Amendment.116 The low end of

108 See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 602 (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal citations omitted).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 565 (7th Cir. 2000).
110 Bibas, supra note 105, at 333.
111 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
112 Id. at 557; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 604 n.5; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000).
113 536 U.S. at 569.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 569–70.
116 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending Apprendi To
Upset Most Sentencing, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 79, 79 (2002) (“The upshot is that Apprendi, which once
threatened the sentencing guidelines and the national trend toward determinate sentencing, is now a caged
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the presumptive guideline range can be set based on judicially found facts. In
the federal context, this meant that judges could continue to sentence based on
their own factual findings about the offense and relevant conduct so long as the
sentence did not exceed the often high—for example, twenty years or more—
maximum penalty for the offense of conviction as set by Congress. Thus, “the
Apprendi hurricane appeared to have petered out.”117 That was before Blakely
v. Washington.118
Ralph Blakely pled guilty to the second-degree kidnapping of his wife
involving both domestic violence and the use of a gun.119 According to the
Washington Criminal Code, Blakely’s offense of conviction, second-degree
kidnapping, carries a statutory maximum of ten years in prison.120 Washington
has a discretionary, determinate sentencing system. It also has legislatively
enacted, presumptive sentencing guidelines. Washington based its guidelines
primarily on the offense of conviction and the defendant’s criminal history.121
Pursuant to the Washington sentencing guidelines, Blakely’s presumptive
sentencing range was forty-nine to fifty-three months in prison.122
Washington’s guidelines—like virtually all presumptive sentencing
guidelines—recognized that the presumptive range would not always be
appropriate.123 As such, the sentencing judge could impose a sentence in
excess of the presumptive range, a so-called “exceptional sentence,” under
certain circumstances.124 If the judge made factual findings of “substantial and

tiger. And the irony is that Justice Antonin Scalia, the only Justice who voted to strike down the Sentencing
Guidelines fourteen years ago, provided the fifth vote that ensures that the Guidelines will survive today.”).
117 Bibas, supra note 105, at 333.
118 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
119 Id. at 2534.
120 Id. at 2535; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (West Supp. 2005).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (“The Washington
Sentencing Reform Act establishes ‘presumptive sentencing ranges’ based on the ‘seriousness level’ of the
offense and the defendant’s ‘offender score.’ The offense seriousness level is determined by the offense of
conviction and the offender score is based upon the defendant’s criminal history.”); Brief for Petitioner at 2,
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) (“The core of the [Washington] Sentencing
Reform Act . . . is a grid of relatively narrow ‘standard ranges,’ or ‘presumptive sentences,’ calculated
according to the seriousness of the offense and the criminal history of the offender.”).
122 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
123 See id.
124 Id. The imposition of an “exceptional sentence” is analogous to an upward departure under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
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compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence,” she could, but was not
required to, impose a sentence higher than the top of the presumptive range.125
In Blakely, the trial judge concluded that Blakely used “deliberate cruelty,”
which is a statutory justification for an exceptional sentence.126 The judge
found the facts necessary to reach the deliberate cruelty conclusion by a
preponderance of the evidence and without the aid of a jury. Based on this
finding of deliberate cruelty, the judge imposed an exceptional sentence of
ninety months in prison.127 Although Blakely claimed that this procedure
violated the Sixth Amendment, the Washington courts affirmed his sentence.128
Blakely brought his case to the Supreme Court of the United States and
alleged that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because the judge,
and not a jury, determined that he had committed his crime with “deliberate
cruelty,” exposing him to the exceptional sentence.129 Washington and its
amici sought a reading of Apprendi that would preserve the existing approach
to presumptive sentencing guidelines.130 They claimed that there is no
constitutional violation as long as the sentence stays within the traditional
statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.131
Justice Scalia, writing for a five Justice majority, employed formalistic
reasoning, took an expansive view of Apprendi, and reversed Blakely’s
sentence.132 The majority focused on the “statutory maximum” language in
Apprendi; in fact, it redefined that term.133 Justice Scalia stated that “the
‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge

125 WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A.535; see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Blakely,
(No. 02-1632) (“In other words, a court may deviate upward from the standard sentencing range only on the
basis of factual findings beyond those required by the elements of the underlying offense.”).
126 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535; see also WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii).
127 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
128 Blakely v. Washington, 47 P.3d 149, 159 (Wash. App. 2002).
129 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
130 Brief of Alabama et al. at 10, Blakely, (No. 02-1632), available at http://www.dwt.com/pdfs/0104_BlakelyBriefofAlabama.pdf.
131 See, e.g., id.
132 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 105, at 333.
133 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Blakely redefined ‘statutory
maximum.’”); Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 952 (“Blakely, however, subsequently transformed the meaning of
the term ‘statutory maximum.’”); Steven G. Kalar et al., A Blakely Primer: An End to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines?, CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 10, 11, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/championarticles/
a0408p10?opendocument (“[T]he key turning point in the [Blakely] decision is the definition of ‘statutory
maximum.’ The Court could have defined this term to mean only the legislative maximum sentence for a
given offense.”).
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may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant.”134 He went on to note that “the relevant ‘statutory
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings.”135 Thus, because of the Washington guidelines, the jury’s verdict
only authorized a sentence up to the top of the guidelines’ presumptive
sentencing range.
The Blakely Court did not attempt to overrule Harris.136 In fact, it arguably
reaffirmed a judge’s ability to find facts that trigger mandatory minimum
penalties.137 Boiled down to its essence, Blakely appears to view Apprendi as a
protection against increasing the statutory maximum, and to view the top of a
legislatively enacted, presumptive sentencing guideline range as being just
such an Apprendi-Blakely statutory maximum. Accordingly, Blakely does not
implicate typical mandatory minimum sentences or the bottoms of presumptive
guideline ranges set by judicial factfinding.138
Working from the majority’s novel definition of a statutory maximum, it
appears that juries must now find all facts—at least in jurisdictions with
legislatively enacted sentencing guidelines—that increase a defendant’s
maximum potential guidelines punishment. Professor Stephanos Bibas has
argued that “[t]hese facts are now elements of the offense.”139 If so, it appears
that these guidelines have effectively created new offenses.140 Despite

134

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
136 Cf. Spero v. United States, 375 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Whatever other effect . . . [Blakely]
may have, it does not undermine the validity of minimum mandatory sentences, at least not where the
enhanced minimum does not exceed the non-enhanced maximum.”).
137 Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 976 (stating that Blakely “confirmed prior case law establishing that
the Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis does not apply to sentencing factors that trigger mandatory minimum
penalties”); id. at 978 (“Blakely . . . confirms that mandatory minimum statutes operate outside the protection
of the Sixth Amendment jury trial and burden of proof requirements.”).
138 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 (distinguishing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), which dealt
with a judicially found mandatory minimum, as not involving “a sentence greater than what state law
authorized on the basis of the verdict alone”). As discussed below, some commentators question whether
Harris will survive post-Blakely. Professor Michael Goldsmith and others make a strong case that these two
lines of authority can co-exist. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 190.
139 Bibas, supra note 105, at 333.
140 For this reason, it is possible that all nonlegislatively enacted guidelines could fall under a separation
of powers analysis. See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 357–60 (4th Cir. 2004) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (arguing against the application of Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in part because
such an application would unconstitutionally allow the Sentencing Commission to create offense elements).
135
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objections that this ruling re-writes the criminal code,141 the Blakely majority
seemed unconcerned with the consequences of its actions.142 Although Justice
Scalia mounted a heated defense of the jury,143 he would seem to permit the
classic, unguided sentencing system, in which the jury is at least as irrelevant
as it was in Blakely’s sentencing.144 In such a system, the jury simply
authorizes imposition of the criminal code’s maximum punishment for the
offense of conviction and gets out of the way. Justice Scalia’s approach would
presumably approve of a return to tariffs where each crime yields a specific,
legislatively set punishment. In other words, Justice Scalia’s approach to
sentencing led him to effectively endorse the extremes while throwing much of
the middle into confusion.145
The dissenters predicted much confusion and turmoil in Blakely’s wake.146
In that, they were correct. They also predicted, however, that Blakely would
result in “greater judicial discretion and less uniformity in sentencing.”147
While certainly possible, that need not be true.

141 Cf. Brief of Alabama et al. at 12, Blakely (No. 02-1632) (“Under this interpretation of Apprendi, the
‘maximum penalty’ for a crime—and thus the definition of the elements of a crime—is no longer a matter of
legislative intent.”), available at http://www.dwt.com/pdfs/01-04_BlakelyBriefofAlabama.pdf.
142 See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority ignores the adverse
consequences inherent in its conclusion.”). While the Blakely opinion is open to serious criticism because its
extension of Apprendi is questionable, Professor Albert Alschuler properly notes that just because a decision is
“breathtakingly unpragmatic,” does not mean that it is improper. Alschuler, supra note 54, at 17. In fact, he
notes that “[t]rue restraint (that is, true respect for the limits of the judicial office) may consist of deciding
legal questions as legal questions without giving extraordinary weight to the political consequences of one’s
decisions.” Id. (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, this lack of concern for the real world consequences of
its actions leaves the Blakely majority open to charges of scholasticism. Cf. Thomas J. Curry, Securing
Religious Liberty: Principles for Judicial Interpretation of the Religion Clauses, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 309, 309
(2001) (“The late medieval period provides an historical parallel. By that time, Scholasticism had degenerated
into a sterile intellectualism and an exercise in logic chopping. Scholastics of that time are sometimes
described as debating how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. Renaissance Humanists, however,
characterized them as assembling in classrooms to ascertain by logical deduction, the number of a horse’s
teeth.”).
143 See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (“The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand
that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest
inconvenience of submitting its accusation to ‘the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours.’”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343).
144 See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541.
145 Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 64 (noting that “the Blakely decision allows for some seemingly
perverse effects”).
146 See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing uncertainty following Blakely in the
federal system).
147 Id. at 2543 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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First to chaos and confusion: In the short term, Blakely left disorder and
uncertainty in its wake all across the country.148 As the dust started to settle,
many jurisdictions realized that Blakely harmed at least parts of their
sentencing schemes, but the full extent of the damage was hard to assess.
Guidelines sentencing systems in Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and
Tennessee now appear to face the same basic Blakely problems as
Washington.149 Thus, at a minimum, these states will have to revise significant
aspects of their presumptive sentencing guidelines. The Vera Institute of
Justice has identified eight other states with presumptive, structured sentencing
systems—but without guidelines—that will be “fundamentally” affected by
Blakely as well as others that may feel Blakely’s bite.150 Many of the states
will need to revise or totally overhaul their sentencing laws. The process of
determining exactly what survives and what falls after Blakely could occupy
the courts for months, if not years. The federal courts have split, both on the
question of whether Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and
if so, on the issue of what that means.151 The Supreme Court promptly agreed
to resolve at least some of these questions,152 but regardless of what the Court
decides, the genie of substantial sentencing reform—state and federal—may
have been released. It is rare, if not unprecedented, that a single Supreme
Court decision not only forces changes in so many jurisdictions but does so in
a way that results in such intense confusion and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, Blakely may go down in history as a force for positive,
substantive sentencing reform. If so, it will be because of the responses of
various legislatures. How should legislatures proceed in the post-Blakely

148 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, High Court Ruling Sows Confusion, USA TODAY, July 12, 2004, at 3A
(stating that early indications vindicate Justice O’Connor’s fear of Blakely wreaking havoc in the trial courts);
Tracy Johnson, Serious Crimes, Less Severe Sentences: Judges Try To Discern How Badly the System Has
Been Upended, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 12, 2004, at A1 (quoting District Court Judge Robert
Lasnik as stating, “What [Blakely] means now is complete and utter chaos”); Matt O’Connor, Lawyer Invokes
Sentencing Ruling, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2004, at 2 (quoting Chief District Court Judge Charles Kocoras as
stating that Blakely created “mass uncertainty”).
149 Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61. For example, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals recently
stated that Blakely “may well obliterate Tennessee’s procedure for determinate sentencing by a judge utilizing
statutory enhancement factors.” State v. Ramey, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 636, at *30 n.4 (July 15,
2004) (citation omitted); see also State v. Whitley, 682 N.W.2d 691, 696–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing
a sentence containing an upward departure in light of Blakely). Kansas also faces these issues but addressed
them earlier because of a ruling similar to Blakely by its state supreme court. State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801
(Kan. 2001).
150 Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 60.
151 See, e.g., Chanenson, supra note 8.
152 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004).
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world? The Court has provided scant guidance on what might satisfy its vision
of the Sixth Amendment. In some ways, since its 1999 decision in Jones, the
Supreme Court has played an elaborate game of Marco Polo153 in which it tells
legislatures the general location of the goal of constitutional sentencing, but
keeps moving the precise target. With Blakely, some state legislatures have
finally caught the target, but their systems need to change; the question is how.
The next Part explores and evaluates some leading options.
III. NOW WHAT? MANY OPTIONS AFTER BLAKELY
Justice O’Connor’s fear of losing decades of sentencing reform need not
materialize.154 Nor is Justice’s Kennedy’s prediction that Blakely will
extinguish “alternative, nonjudicial, sources of ideas and experience”155
inevitable. It is true that legislatures could return to either tariffs or fully
discretionary sentencing, be it determinate or indeterminate. Unquestionably,
either of these options would be tragic. It would throw away decades of hard
work and productive thought, resulting in less justice for offenders and society
at large.
Fortunately, however, legislatures have several options for structuring
sentencing in a way that complies with Blakely. The four such options
discussed below range from light guidance (fully voluntary guidelines) to
relatively firm guidance (Blakely-izing traditional presumptive guidelines in
determinate systems156). Yet, they all come at a significant cost in either the
relative uniformity versus relative individualization tradeoff, or
proportionality, or both. They careen from nearly wide-open sentencing
discretion both up and down to discretion primarily reserved for sentence
increases to stunted discretion to lengthen sentences when appropriate. Unlike
the new Indeterminate Structured Sentencing approach discussed in Part IV,
these four options do not strike an acceptable balance between reasonable
uniformity and reasonable individualization while maintaining a high
likelihood of relatively proportional results.

153 See Rules of Marco Polo, available at http://www.partygamecentral.com/pgcstandard/gametmpstd.asp
?gn=MARCO+POLO (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
154 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156 See infra text accompanying note 210.
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A. The Fully Voluntary Approach
Fully voluntary guidelines provide nonbinding suggestions that the judge is
free to adopt, modify, or disregard when imposing a sentence.157 There is no
need for the judge to provide a reason for declining to follow the guidelines.
All that would be necessary is to take pre-Blakely presumptive guidelines, such
as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and make them completely advisory or
fully voluntary.158
Fully voluntary sentencing guidelines survive Blakely.159 The Sixth
Amendment is not offended if judges have complete discretion to impose any
sentence up to the statutory maximum. Under this approach, the Blakely
statutory maximum and the traditional statutory maximum converge. The
judge can impose whatever sentence she deems appropriate. The fact that a
sentencing commission promulgates fully voluntary guidelines is effectively
irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment analysis. Unfortunately, as with other postBlakely options, the aspect of the fully voluntary guidelines system that
ensures its compatibility with the Sixth Amendment (the nonbinding nature of
the guidelines) is also a prime substantive liability.

157 I adopt the phrase “fully voluntary guidelines” from Wool and Stemen. See Wool & Stemen, supra
note 5, at 66.
The fully voluntary guideline approach is to be compared to a “voluntary” guidelines system where a
judge must give a reason before departing from the “voluntary” guidelines range. Conceivably, there could be
appellate review of those reasons. See, e.g., id. However, the availability of meaningful appellate review of
sentences under such a system is, at best, in question because of Blakely. If an appellate court provides greater
scrutiny to sentences that deviate from the “voluntary” guidelines, one could argue that the top of the allegedly
“voluntary” guideline range should be viewed as a Blakely statutory maximum. Therefore, departures above
that point would not be possible without jury factfinding or a defendant’s admission. See, e.g., id. at 63
(“[T]he requirement that a judge state reasons as a pre-condition of an enhanced sentence may establish the top
of the guidelines range as the effective maximum sentence—a situation no different from the one presented in
Blakely.”). As such, I will discuss the fully voluntary guideline approach.
158 See, e.g., Kate Stith & William Stuntz, Sense and Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A27; see
also United States v. Hakley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15784, at *21 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2004) (“By treating
the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, judges will gain the benefits of having
a comprehensive set of recommendations available to them while avoiding the drawbacks of being forced to
follow those recommendations even when they are clearly inapplicable.”).
159 Perhaps for this reason, they appear to have been a popular choice of federal district courts in the
months immediately after Blakely. “Among the courts that have held that Blakely applies to the federal
guidelines, the most common response appears to be to treat the guidelines as advisory.” U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES SUBSEQUENT TO THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION IN BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON 2 (2004), available at http://www.ussc/gov/Blakely/blakelyoutr
eachpreliminaryfindings.pdf. However, at least one commentator has questioned whether such guidelines and
wide judicial discretion should be permissible. See Mark D. Harris, Blakely’s Unfinished Business, 17 FED.
SENT. REP. 83, 85–87 (2004) (arguing that Blakely undermines Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
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Fully voluntary sentencing guidelines present many—but not all—of the
problems inherent in unguided, discretionary sentencing system. Fully
voluntary sentencing guidelines can, however, provide judges with guidance
that is more useful than the often vast statutory punishment range. Indeed,
despite the absence of binding rules, many judges would still want some form
of guidance so as to avoid the pitfalls of the past unguided, discretionary
system. Judge Gerard Lynch describes it well from the federal perspective:
“After nearly two decades of Guideline sentencing, which followed decades of
criticism of the unconstrained discretion that culminated in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984[, which ushered in the federal guidelines], it is doubtful
that any federal court would be comfortable wielding such extraordinary
discretion.”160 Judge Lynch has noted that a fully voluntary approach could
work to reduce disparity.
But the use of the Guidelines as guidelines—that is, as an advisory
system of principles that both (1) sets a general level of severity of
sentences deemed appropriate by a judicious body of politically
responsible experts and (2) creates a methodology and enumerates
factors to be applied to assess the seriousness of criminal conduct and
the severity of an offender’s criminal record—would be a significant
step toward controlling unwonted disparity and giving meaningful
161
structure to the exercise of discretion.

Judge Lynch nicely describes a fully voluntary guidelines system that
works well. Having fully advisory guidelines is substantially better than
having no guidance whatsoever. Given the current composition of the federal
bench—with the majority of judges never having imposed a sentence without
Sentencing Guidelines162—a considerable degree of compliance with federal,
fully voluntary guidelines seems likely.

160

United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id.
162 David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial
Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 224 (2004) (“[T]he majority of sitting federal judges have
experienced only the Guidelines and hence there was no golden era to which they harkened back.”).
161

CHANENSON GALLEYS7

2005]

4/21/2005 10:00 AM

THE NEXT ERA OF SENTENCING REFORM

411

Yet fully voluntary systems might not work well—certainly not for the
long haul.163 This is an unusual moment in the history of the federal bench.
Judges see the prospect of escaping from the yoke of the pre-Blakely Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. It would not be surprising for these federal judges to
follow such fully voluntary guidelines closely but not “slavishly.”164
Fast forward another twenty years and the picture may not be so rosy. The
next generation of federal judges would grow up on the fully voluntary
guidelines system and never experience the rigid pre-Blakely Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. How closely would they follow the fully voluntary
guidelines? It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty. It seems,
however, that without some galvanizing experience (like toiling under the preBlakely Federal Sentencing Guidelines), many judges spread out across the
country would start to use more and more of their discretionary powers.165 The
range of sentences would likely expand—both up and down—in a fashion
similar to the pre-Guidelines experience, although perhaps not to that same
extent.
Furthermore, even a fully advisory guidelines system that works well and
yields substantial compliance will be cold comfort to the defendant who
receives, inappropriately in his view, a sentence that is too harsh. Similarly,
the prosecutor who sees a defendant sentenced as a lenient outlier is not likely
to be mollified by the knowledge that this does not happen too often. A system
of fully advisory guidelines is better than one of unguided discretion, but it still
does not provide significant protection against invidious bias and other
unwarranted disparities.

163 See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 37, at 193 (“[E]xperience with voluntary guidelines in a number of states
(excluding Delaware, which is a special case) shows that judges seldom follow them and that disparities are
unaffected.”). It appears that Missouri employs a fully voluntary guidelines system, but it is unclear how well
it works. See MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT ON RECOMMENDED SENTENCING 4 n.1
(2004), available at http://www.doc.missouri.gov/pdf/Missouri%20Sentencing%20Advisory%20Commission.
pdf (“The commission labels its work as Sentencing Recommendations because that is what they are.”); 32
ROBERT H. DIERKER, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES § 57.1 (1st ed. 1998) (“The Guidelines are gaining currency
among trial judges, at least in metropolitan areas. However, the suspicion persists that many prosecutors
merely pay them lip service, while adhering to their previous plea-bargaining practices.”). Virginia has had a
generally positive experience with voluntary guidelines; but it, too, may be a special case, perhaps in part
because of the legislative role in selecting judges. See Adam Liptak, Judges’ New Leeway in Choosing
Sentences May Result in Little Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A14.
164 Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
165 The prospects may be brighter for smaller, more cohesive benches—particularly those in which all the
judges are located in one courthouse—where the informal pressure to conform may well be greater.
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As shown below, this fully voluntary sentencing guidelines approach has a
very high, but not extreme, degree of individualization.

Significant
Individualization

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

Relatedly, it rates a medium-low score on the proportionality confidence index.
A fully voluntary system may often yield a relatively proportional sentence,
but there are still many opportunities for disproportionate sentences (on a
relative scale). Judges could exercise their right to hyper-individualize as well
as impose their own sense of justice, thus imperiling relative proportionality,
with impunity.
An example may be helpful. While grappling with his first post-Blakely
sentencing, the very wise and thoughtful Judge Lynch recently noted that he
would sentence a securities fraud defendant to twenty-four months if the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were advisory. This is nine months less than
the bottom of the applicable guideline range. Judge Lynch justified the
twenty-four month sentence by noting that the “Guidelines place undue weight
on the amount of loss involved in the fraud . . . . In many cases, including this
one, the amount stolen is a relatively weak indicator of the moral seriousness
of the offense or the need for deterrence.”166 He went on to observe, consistent
with many critics of the Guidelines, that
while the Guidelines appropriately steer the Court toward a
significantly punitive and deterrent sentence, and counsel against
giving undue weight to other facts, they err in giving virtually no
weight to the ‘history and characteristics of the defendant,’ which

166 Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 427. Ultimately, Judge Lynch found the Guidelines binding and
sentenced the defendant to thrity-three months in prison. Id. at 436.
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Congress instructs the sentencing courts to consider equally with ‘the
167
nature and circumstances of the offense.

Judge Lynch is probably correct that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
too rigid and perhaps better-drafted guidelines would allow for this kind of
latitude from the ends of the current Guidelines range.168 Yet, a judge’s ability
to dispense with the fully voluntary guidelines simply because she disagrees
with the policy choices inherent in those guidelines can rapidly lead to both
unwarranted disparity and a greater chance of disproportionality.169 In similar
cases across the jurisdiction—be it state or federal—not every judge is going to
agree. Some judges will follow the voluntary guidelines and operate within the
latitude they provide as written. Other judges will disagree with the guidelines
and sentence the defendant to a lesser (or greater) sentence with a smaller (or
larger) amount of variance from the advisory markers. By discounting fully
voluntary guidelines with which she disagrees, a judge may (or may not)
achieve a better measure of justice in the individual case before her.
Nevertheless, it is very questionable that the sentencing system itself is better
off.
167

Id. at 428 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000)).
Some people (presumably not the defendant) would view the difference of nine months as not being a
substantial deviation from the guidelines in a fully voluntary system. See id. (“The sentence is also of the
same general level of magnitude as that provided in the Guidelines; it can hardly be said that a sentence of two
years rather than two years and nine months disrespects the policies underlying the Guidelines or undermines
deterrence.”). Judge Lynch astutely notes this general concern:
168

In setting this particular length of imprisonment as satisfying the Court’s analysis of the factors
relevant to sentencing, the Court takes account not merely of the facts to which the Guidelines
direct attention, but also of the overall level of severity proposed by the Guidelines. While any
individual judge might prefer an overall more lenient or more severe table of punishments, a
principal value of the Guidelines is in freeing defendants from disparities created by such
preferences, and providing benchmarks for what society as a whole, and judges in particular,
consider the appropriate scale of punishment for different degrees of crime.
Id. at 425 n.11.
The nine month difference in this case as a percentage (27%), however, translates to a much larger
absolute number at higher levels of severity. It becomes disturbingly large even when seen in the full context
of Emmenegger. If 27% below the bottom of the range is consistent with the intent of the Guidelines, then
certainly a sentence 27% above the top of the range is also consistent with the intent of the Guidelines. Yet,
Judge Lynch does not address either the size of the sentencing range he has just created (a 27% extension to
both the top and the bottom of the otherwise-applicable range yields a span from 24–52 months), or the fact
that different judges could disagree with other parts of the guidelines and then set their own appropriate
sentencing ranges. Indeed, a critical objection to fully voluntary guidelines is that an individual judge can
freely disagree with the policy choices reflected in the guidelines.
169 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.XX, at 207 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004) (discussing draft
provision which “excludes departures premised on bare disagreement with the commission’s judgment
concerning an appropriate penalty for an ‘ordinary case’ under the guidelines”).
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Fully voluntary sentencing guidelines help judges to know what their
colleagues are doing and encourage them, in part through a desire to stay with
the pack, to conform. The assumption that fully voluntary guidelines mean
absolutely no controls on sentencing discretion is neither true nor fair.
However, by providing weak protections in individual cases, this approach
could easily deteriorate into little more than the discredited unguided,
discretionary approach.
B. The Inversion Approach
The inversion approach would take a presumptive guidelines system, like
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and turn it on its head. All presumptive
sentences would start at the traditional statutory maximum and the judge would
then mitigate in either a guided or an unguided fashion.170 Instead of starting
at a comparatively low base offense level and asking how much the particular
nature of the offense (e.g., presence of a gun) and the offender increases the
sentence, the judge would start at the statutory maximum and ask how much
the particular nature of the offense (e.g., absence of a gun) and the offender
decreases the sentence. The system would simply start high and move low
instead of starting low and moving high. The end result can, in theory, be the
same as the presumptive sentencing guidelines system it might replace.
At first blush, this would not seem to offend Blakely.171 Under this
approach, the Blakely statutory maximum and the traditional statutory
maximum converge. The court does not increase a defendant’s potential
maximum sentence based on judicial factfinding.172 Yet it may not be that
simple. Unlike some other options that make slight modifications from past
practices to comply with Blakely, the inversion approach turns the entire
system upside down. This may be too much for the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court was aware of this general method of responding to its
initial Apprendi opinion. The Apprendi Court brushed aside concerns about
raising all statutory maxima to, say, life in prison, because it felt that undefined

170 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2558 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress and state
legislatures might, for example, rewrite their criminal codes, attaching astronomically high sentences to each
crime, followed by long lists of mitigating facts, which, for the most part, would consist of the absence of
aggravating facts.”) (citation omitted).
171 Id.
172 Cf. Bibas, supra note 105, at 339 (“The utterly formalistic logic of Apprendi permits this [Inversion
Approach] gimmick, as a defendant supposedly has fair warning of the highest possible sentence.”).
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“structural democratic constraints” would prevent such a move.173 Some
commentators have responded that the Court overestimated the power of such
nebulous constraints.174 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court left itself some
wiggle room in Apprendi to thwart legislatures from attempting this kind of a
response.175 As Professor Bibas has noted, “Apprendi hinted . . . that if a
legislature redrafted its entire criminal code to turn aggravators into mitigators,
the Court might invalidate this [inversion] gimmick.”176
Substantively, this approach may or may not make sense. It all depends on
the way in which a judge’s discretion to mitigate down from the traditional
statutory maximum is controlled. It can skew toward uniformity or
individualization. Even more than the typical system, the devil would be in the
details.
At the policy level—if not the constitutional level—there may be a burden
shifting concern. Is it wise and appropriate to require the defendant to
demonstrate the existence of mitigating facts? This is one potential solution:
The initial guideline sentence would be the statutory maximum.177 However,
there could be a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is entitled to have
that sentence mitigated.178 The government would then have the burden to
actually rebut the presumption—to disprove any claimed mitigating factor—if
it wants the higher sentence. This rebuttable presumption twist is arguably
Blakely compliant because there is no Sixth Amendment problem with
mitigating sentences irrespective of the jury’s findings. Nevertheless, as noted
above, the Court may regard this entire inversion approach with suspicion.

173

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n.16 (2000).
See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1490–92,
1546 (2001).
175 530 U.S. at 490 n.16 (“In all events, if such an extensive revision of the State’s entire criminal code
were enacted for the purpose [of evading Apprendi’s rule], or if New Jersey simply reversed the burden of the
hate crime finding (effectively assuming a crime was performed with a purpose to intimidate and then
requiring a defendant to prove that it was not . . .), we would be required to question whether the revision was
constitutional under this Court’s prior decisions.”) (citations omitted).
176 Bibas, supra note 105, at 339; see also Stephanos Bibas, Reforming the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
After Blakely 5–6 (U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 01-01, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID634202_code53766pdf?abstractid=634202&mirid=1.
177 I thank Professor Alan Michaels for this idea. He made this point during a conference call with
Professor Douglas Berman and me on June 24, 2004, the day the Supreme Court decided Blakely. Cf. Alan C.
Michaels, Truth in Convicting: Understanding and Evaluating Apprendi, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 320 (2000).
178 In other words, what are now aggravating factors, would become mitigating factors by stating them in
the negative—e.g., not being a leader or organizer, not having vulnerable victims.
174
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Some commentators view this option as a “more threatening response[] to
Blakely.”179 Particularly, Wool and Stemen note that “there is no reason to
believe this option will prove attractive to state policymakers as it would be
costly and might lead to harsh, perhaps unpredictable, sentences.”180 While
odd, this inversion approach will not necessarily produce unpleasant results. A
judge might be less willing to mitigate and risk a reputation of being “soft” on
crime, but much depends on how the power or responsibility to mitigate is
constructed. The inversion approach need not be any worse (or any better)
than the presumptive guidelines schemes it may replace.
Ultimately, however, it is that uncertainty that makes the inversion
approach unappealing. It may pass constitutional muster, but any legislature
that adopts it is daring the Supreme Court to make good on its threat in
Apprendi and to strike it down. It may result in a sensible sentencing system,
but it may also end up being nothing more than a convoluted way to
reintroduce disparity. This option is just not worth the risk.181
C. The Tops-Off Approach
The tops-off approach, championed by Professor Frank Bowman as an
interim measure for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,182 would raise the top
of each sentencing range to the statutory maximum. It would leave the bottom
of the range unchanged. Under this model, the sentencing judge would have,
by virtue of the jury verdict or guilty plea, the ability to impose a sentence up
to the legislatively enacted statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.
As a result, the judge would be able to impose a sentence anywhere from the
bottom of the current presumptive sentencing range to the legislatively enacted
statutory maximum. Although initially designed for the federal system,
legislatures could apply this general approach to virtually any presumptive
guidelines system.
The tops-off approach should satisfy the requirements of Blakely. This
scheme permits judges to sentence up to the traditional statutory maximum
without further factfinding. As such, the Blakely statutory maximum and the
179

Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 67.
Id.
181 Cf. Frank O. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for
Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 263 (2004) (“This scheme seems so
counterintuitive that one can hardly believe that it would be seriously contemplated.”).
182 Frank Bowman, Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 364, 367–68 (2004).
180
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traditional statutory maximum converge. Courts would only set the bottom of
the guideline range by judicial factfinding, which remains permissible under
Harris.183 Some opponents of this plan argue that it will be found
unconstitutional, because Harris will be reversed (perhaps imminently),184 or it
is at best an inappropriate circumvention of Blakely.185 While there are
significant problems with this approach, neither of these claims is persuasive
for at least two reasons.
First, as at least one of the tops-off approach’s critics acknowledges,186 and
Professor Bowman confirms,187 this proposal passes muster as long as Harris
remains good law. While there is tension between Blakely and Harris, it is far
from clear that the Supreme Court will overrule its recent precedent of
Harris.188 In fact, it should be noted that Justice Scalia—the author of
Blakely—joined the Harris majority.189 Furthermore, Professor and former
Federal Sentencing Commissioner Michael Goldsmith reads the Blakely
majority as having “confirmed prior case law establishing that the Court’s
Sixth Amendment analysis does not apply to sentencing factors that trigger
mandatory minimum penalties.”190 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
183 In some ways, this is the determinate sentencing analogue to the ISS approach discussed below. See
infra Part IV. For the reasons discussed in the text, however, it is a far less attractive option.
184 E.g., Letter from Jon M. Sands, Sentencing Guidelines Committee of the Federal and Community
Public Defenders, to Commissioners of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 5 (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Letter
from Jon M. Sands], available at http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/SandsLtr7-0904.pdf (arguing that the tops-off approach is unconstitutional, although acknowledging that it remains viable
under Harris).
185 Letter from Amy Baron-Evans & Mark Flanagan, Practitioners’ Advisory Group, to the Honorable
Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair Judge, U.S. Sentencing Commission 2 (July 9, 2004), available at
http://www.sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/pag_letter.doc (stating that “this
proposal would simply evade Blakely”); Letter from Jon M. Sands, supra note 184 (arguing that this approach
“seeks to evade the rule enunciated in Blakely”).
186 Letter from Jon M. Sands, supra note 184 (noting that the proposal “is viable only so long as the
opinion of the Court in Harris survives”).
187 Frank Bowman, Memorandum Presenting the Case for Rapid Congressional Action in Response to
Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 369, 370–71 (2004) (noting that the constitutionality of his
proposal “hinges on the continued viability of the Harris decision”).
188 Id. at 371 (“I concede that Harris seems at odds with the emphasis placed by Justice Scalia in Blakely
on the importance of the jury as indispensable sentencing fact-finder. However, Harris was equally at odds
with the spirit of Apprendi, a point which did not deter the Court, including Justice Scalia from deciding
Harris as it did.”); see also Spero v. United States, 375 F.3d 1285, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that
Blakely and Apprendi “explicitly distinguished minimum mandatory sentences from the circumstances
involved in those cases and indicated that McMillan v. Pennsylvania [477 U.S. 79 (1986)] is still good law”).
189 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 548 (2000).
190 Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 976; see also id. at 977 (“Blakely . . . confirms that mandatory minimum
statutes operate outside the protection of the Sixth Amendment jury trial and burden of proof requirements.”);
Bibas, supra note 176, at 2 (noting the compatibility between Blakely and Harris on issues of lack of historical
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that “[w]hatever other effect . . . [Blakely] may have, it does not undermine the
validity of minimum mandatory sentences, at least not where the enhanced
minimum does not exceed the non-enhanced maximum.”191 Finally, Professor
Bibas powerfully argued that “[t]here is no obvious way that the Court could or
would extend Apprendi to forbid [the tops-off approach]. On the contrary, the
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that judges may find facts and set sentences
within ranges, so long as they do not increase the tops of those ranges.”192
Mere speculation that Harris may not endure is a thin reason to denigrate the
broad contours of the tops-off approach.
Second, it is difficult to call this approach an evasion of Blakely. For better
or worse, Blakely is a formalistic decision.193 To cry foul when a legislative
response works within the boundaries of that formalism is both erroneous and
disingenuous. This type of a response is simply “a natural application of the
Constitution.”194 Whether it is sound policy is another matter entirely.
Though viable, the tops-off approach is problematic, risking both the
reasonable uniformity versus reasonable individualization tradeoff and relative
proportionality. It will also be difficult for this approach to enable serious
appellate review of a judge’s sentence within the potentially enormous
sentencing range. In fact, the American Bar Association has argued that this
approach “is conducive to the very sort of unbridled judicial discretion that
guidelines sentencing was intended to eliminate.”195
Given its genesis in the federal system, it makes sense to examine how the
tops-off approach might work in that environment. It would likely re-inject
into the federal sentencing system excessive unregulated discretion that would,
role for juries in “find[ing] facts that trigger minima,” fair warning to defendant of potential punishment and
judicial discretion). But see Kalar et al., supra note 133, at 15 (noting that Harris and McMillan “appear
increasingly incompatible with the reasoning of Apprendi and now Blakely”).
191 Spero, 375 F.3d at 1286.
192 Bibas, supra note 105, at 339.
193 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (approving schemes where judicial
factfinding does “not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence” and asserting that
“that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is
concerned”); id. at 2547 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult for me to discern what principle besides
doctrinaire formalism actually motivates today’s decision.”).
194 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 519 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (approving
open-ended sentencing and concluding that the Supreme Court “saw this not as an ‘evasion’ but as a natural
application of the Constitution”).
195 Letter from Dennis W. Archer, President of the American Bar Association, to the Honorable Orrin G.
Hatch, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Honorable Patrick Leahy, Ranking Democrat on
the Committee on the Judiciary (July 12, 2004) (on file with author).
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at a minimum, result in dangerous outliers. This newfound discretion would
only operate to lengthen sentences. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
numerous restrictions on mitigating departures below the otherwise applicable
range.196 These restrictions do not and, under Blakely, could not apply to
sentences of increased severity. As such, the system could become more
“asymmetrical,”197 and potentially yield longer sentences.
For example, before Blakely, a first-time offender convicted of one count of
federal mail fraud for defrauding one person out of $4500 would face a
guideline range of zero to six months in prison. Under the tops-off approach,
this same defendant would face a guideline range of zero to twenty years in
prison.198 In this admittedly stark example, this approach would effectively
reproduce the old, pre-guidelines, unguided, indeterminate system with the
added difficulty of lacking the potential “leveling” effect of parole release
authority.
With sentencing ranges of this sort, the tops-off approach runs the very real
risk of sparking a significant degree of individualization, as shown below.

Significant
Individualization

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

It avoids an extreme degree of individualization for the disturbing reason that
judges cannot easily tailor sentences below the applicable range. This largely
one-way ratchet of discretion also translates into a low score on the
proportionality confidence index.
196

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2004).
Mark Osler, The Blakely Problem and the 3x Solution, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 344, 346 (2004); see also
Letter from Amy Baron-Evans & Mark Flanagan, Practitioners’ Advisory Group, to the Honorable Ricardo H.
Hinojosa, Chair Judge, U.S. Sentencing Commission 2 (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.sentencing.type
pad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/pag_letter.doc (asserting that “this proposal would add to the
imbalance and create the unwarranted disparity the Guidelines were intended to eliminate”).
198 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1.
197
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In an effort to contain sentences, the Commission could make a fully
advisory recommendation that, absent compelling, aggravating circumstances,
judges should keep their sentences within 25% of the bottom of the range,
which is the current spread for most ranges.199 This could help persuade
judges to rein in their broad, discretionary impulses. Unfortunately, this would
have the same limitations as other fully advisory guidelines, and it would not
be able to address outlier cases, whether relatively extreme or moderate.
Furthermore, appellate courts will not be able to intercede in a particularly
effective fashion.200 Appellate review could continue to police the bottom of
the range by adjudicating disputes over which the guideline range applies and
by regulating downward departures.201 Concerning where within the newly
expanded range the judge imposed sentence, however, the appellate court’s
involvement would be sharply restricted. The court of appeals could intervene
if a judge expressly relied on improper factors (for example, race, religion, or
gender).202 Under Blakely, the appellate court could not view a sentence
imposed outside of any voluntary or recommended part of the applicable range
(for example, 25% above the bottom of the range) as presenting a reason to
reverse. If it did, the Supreme Court would likely view that so-called
voluntary recommendation as the equivalent of a now-typical presumptive
guideline and treat it as a Blakely statutory maximum.203 This would, of
course, defeat the entire purpose of the tops-off approach. Accordingly, this
approach would likely preclude meaningful appellate review.204
199 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 105, at 339; Bowman, supra note 182, at 367 (“[T]he Commission might
think it proper to enact a policy statement recommending that courts not impose sentences more than 25%
higher than the guideline minimum in the absence of one or more of the factors now specified in the
Guidelines as potential grounds for upward departure.”).
200 In his initial proposal, Professor Bowman did not suggest appellate review of sentences imposed
within these broad ranges. Bowman, supra note 182, at 367 (“Failure to adhere to this [25%] recommendation
would not be appealable, and thus such a provision would not fall foul of Blakely.”). He now suggests
appellate review but continues to wrestle with how much review and whether it would satisfy Blakely.
Bowman, supra note 181, at 262, 263 & n.168.
201 See, e.g., Vinegrad, supra note 95, at 312 (discussing searching appellate review of downward
departures).
202 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 181, at 246.
203 See Bibas, supra note 105, at 339 (“Appellate review might also scrutinize upward departures,
[presumably from the recommended 25% range,] though searching review might make the upper bound seem
too law-like and trigger Blakely protections.”); Bibas, supra note 176, at 3–4 (same); see also supra note 58.
204 Congress could also impose many new mandatory minimum sentences, as long as Harris is good law.
This approach, which has justifiably earned the contempt of most commentators and judges, could move the
uniformity of the federal system toward levels that ignore the differences in offenses and offenders. It would
also, for reasons similar to those concerning tariffs, promote selective prosecutorial application, encourage
evasion, and reduce relative proportionality. See, e.g., Statement of Rachel E. Barkow Before the Senate
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As a practical matter, however, there is some current appeal to this
approach. Many federal judges now sentence at or near the bottom of the
sentencing range and rarely depart above the range.205 While this lowers the
current risk of high-severity outlier sentences, it is not a guarantee of future
behavior. Freed from both the narrow ranges of the current Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the oversight of upward sentences, it would not be surprising to
see judges eventually raise their individual sentences—at least for some
deserving, or just unlucky, defendants—and widen the spread of sentences as a
group. Many district court judges perceive that the guidelines are too harsh;
this belief at least partially motivates the current federal practice.206 Not only
can perceptions change, but judges do not necessarily hold that view
concerning all offenses, particularly nondrug offenses.
The tops-off approach enjoyed significant Congressional support in the
months after Blakely.207 Applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is an
easy fix, requiring only a few legislative and guidelines changes.208 It appears
that several states, including Minnesota, could also take advantage of this
relatively simple Blakely solution. In fact, that is one of the proposal’s most
attractive selling points. The ease of transition into a post-Blakely world,
however, is more than offset by the dramatic, largely unreviewable increase in
discretion to increase (but not decrease) sentences, and the sentencing disparity
that will likely result. The pleasant part about the tops-off approach is the
journey, not the destination.

Judiciary Committee 5 (July 13, 2004), at http://www.blakelyblog.com/Testimony%20Barkow.pdf (noting that
“the criticisms highlight mandatory minimums’ inequity and inconsistent application, which undermine the
goals of uniformity and certainty”). While this may be a politically viable option, it is so objectionable as to
warrant little discussion. See TONRY, supra note 37, at 134 (“The greatest gap between knowledge and policy
in American sentencing concerns mandatory penalties. Experienced practitioners and social science
researchers have long agreed, for practical and policy reasons . . . that mandatory penalties are a bad idea.”).
205 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 63
tbl.45 (2002), available at www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/table45.pdf (noting that overall upward departure
rate is 0.2%).
206 Bibas, supra note 105, at 339 (“What really does the work is not the top but the bottom of each range,
where most sentences cluster and below which some judges strain to go. Judges currently depart upwards in
fewer than 1% of cases, in part because many judges think the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines are too harsh
already.”). Additionally, judges in nonfederal jurisdictions need not have the same attitude toward their own
presumptive guidelines ranges.
207 Id. (“The most likely response is one proposed by Professor Frank Bowman, which is currently
gathering steam on Capitol Hill.”).
208 See Bowman, supra note 182, 367–68.
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D. The Blakely-izing Approach
An approach adopted by Kansas and supported by some segments of the
defense bar209 would require jury findings (or defendant admissions) of
aggravating facts before a sentence could exceed the top of the presumptive
guideline range.210 This logical effort, which can be called “Blakely-izing,” to
modify traditional, presumptive guidelines in a determinate sentencing
jurisdiction incorporates the jury’s role while keeping a good amount of
sentencing guidance. Unfortunately, Blakely-izing presumptive guidelines
imposes several distorting effects on the overall sentencing system. In Kansas,
for example, it appears to have driven some judicial discretion further
underground, potentially increasing individualization and decreasing relative
proportionality. Minnesota seems likely to pursue this approach as well, but in
that state, it is likely to increase uniformity and decrease relative
proportionality. Ultimately, the Blakely-izing approach comes at a substantial
cost and is far less advantageous than the ISS option discussed below.
This option satisfies Blakely without question. It requires the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt (or the defendant to admit) all facts that would raise
the defendant’s punishment above the top of the applicable presumptive
guidelines range. Justice Scalia pointed to Kansas’s Blakely-izing experience
as an example of how jurisdictions could react to Blakely.211
1. Limits on Upward Departures
The Blakely-izing approach can take various forms. As applied in Kansas,
which is similar to how Minnesota may respond, the tactic succeeds in making
the sentencing system Blakely-compliant, but it does so by limiting the
departure tool. This is a critical failing, because a fully developed departure
power works to compensate for the fact that sentencing commissions and their
guidelines cannot capture all of the relevant features of every case.212 The
209

See, e.g., Letter from Jon M. Sands, supra note 184 (supporting the Kansas approach).
That presumptive range would be authorized solely by the guilty verdict for the offense of conviction.
211 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2541 (2004).
212 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004) (discussing some of the many
potential variations in just bank robbery); id. (“[A] sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle
of each case can become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent
effect.”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.XX, at 206 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004) (“The guidelines
do not enumerate as an aggravating factor that a defendant has feigned emotional involvement with a victim in
furtherance of an offense. Nonetheless, the trial court may rely on this factor as basis for an upward departure
if the court concludes that the defendant’s actions intensified the harms done to the victim, increased the
offender’s blameworthiness in the commission of the crimes, or both, so long as the degree of departure is
210
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upshot of Blakely-izing can be conflicting lurches toward leniency or severity
at the cost of overall relative proportionality.213 Ultimately, Blakely-izing’s
restriction of upward departures throws the entire guidelines approach out of
balance.214 Furthermore, it risks unwarranted increases in overall sentences.
That risk of system wide sentence increases is real. If judges, commentators,
legislators, or the general public view a sentence for a case with egregious
facts as being too lenient because no upward departure was readily available,
the political response may be to increase the standard presumptive range for all
instances of that offense. A rising tide may indeed lift all sentencing boats.
Before Apprendi, Kansas had presumptive guidelines, in a discretionary,
determinate sentencing scheme that, like many other state systems, required
comparatively little judicial factfinding to reach the presumptive range.215
Most courts around the nation interpreted Apprendi to apply only to the
traditional statutory maxima, which kept their sentencing guidelines schemes
intact. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, issued its own version of Blakely
in 2001.216 In response, Kansas retained its presumptive sentencing guidelines
approach but added a jury factfinding mechanism to authorize departure
sentences above the presumptive guidelines range.217 The government must
give at least thirty days notice if it intends to seek an enhanced departure
sentence, and the judge decides whether those facts will be determined during
trial or in a postverdict hearing as part of a bifurcated process.218 If the jury
unanimously finds the factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge may—but

proportionate in light of those considerations.”); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 557 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There are, to put it simply, far too many potentially relevant sentencing factors to
permit submission of all (or even many) of them to a jury.”).
213 If the presumptive sentencing range authorized by the offense of conviction is large enough, it is also
possible for a nominally Blakely-ized system to resemble an unguided system in many (often unfortunate)
respects. See infra text accompanying note 248.
214 Blakely does not require restrictions on downward departures.
At this point, I do not necessarily challenge the wisdom of an increased role for jury sentencing (for
those few defendants who have trials), although there are reasons to be concerned. See, e.g., Nancy J. King &
Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885 (2004).
Furthermore, I certainly do not dispute the need for serious federal criminal code reform. Rather, I focus on
the need for meaningful, but bounded, judicial sentencing discretion, which is likely best achieved through a
fully developed departure power.
215 See, e.g., David Gottlieb, Kansas Adopts Sentencing Guidelines, in SENTENCING REFORM IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES 106, 106 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997) (“On July 1, 1993, Kansas
will add its name to the list of states that have scrapped an indeterminate sentencing system and replaced it
with a determinate system of presumptive sentencing guidelines.”).
216 State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).
217 Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 64.
218 Id. at 64–65 (citation omitted).
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need not—depart and impose a sentence in excess of the otherwise-applicable
guidelines range.219 A similar response is being contemplated in Minnesota.220
At a minimum, obtaining an aggravated departure sentence under Kansas’s
Blakely-ized system is more complicated and cumbersome than in the past.221
One likely practical result is that there will be fewer upward departures,
perhaps because prosecutors may view them as unworthy of the time and effort
required.222 For whatever reason, initial reports from Kansas indicate that
there have been almost no bifurcated jury proceedings.223 Defenders of this
approach point out that “it had always been rare for [Kansas] judges to
sentence defendants to enhanced sentences after trial, largely because in a pleadriven system the available sentences after trial are already effectively
‘enhanced.’”224 However, this argument ignores the fact that more defendants
likely accepted pleas because they knew that prosecutors could fairly easily
persuade a judge to consider an enhanced sentence under the old judicial
factfinding system. If prosecutors have a more difficult time proving to a jury
219

Id. at 65.
See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, The Impact of Blakely v. Washington on
Sentencing in Minnesota (Short Term Recommendations), 17 FED. SENT. REP. 75, 77–78 (2004).
221 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 105, at 338 (“Trying enhancements before the first jury . . . could prejudice
it on the issue of guilt, while bifurcating or empaneling [sic] a second jury would be costly and timeconsuming . . . . [M]ulti-part, complex verdict forms full of conditional questions would be hard for jurors to
manage.”); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas,
110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1144 (2001) (asserting that bifurcation would be cumbersome and create improper
incentives for prosecutors).
222 See, e.g., Osler, supra note 197, at 346 (describing sentencing juries as “a process which would further
bog down federal sentencing”); Word on the Street in NC, Sentencing Law and Policy, at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/08/word_from_the_s.html (“For high-volume
crimes like drugs or property offenses, it is simply not worth the effort right now to move from the
presumptive range (say, 16 to 20 months) up to the aggravated range (say, 20 to 24 months). Volume,
combined with the limited benefits of upward adjustments, convince[s] most prosecutors not to bother with
new techniques to obtain jury findings.”) (Aug. 8, 2004) (posting by Ronald Wright); Spanning the States,
Sentencing Law and Policy, at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/08/spanning_
the_st.html (“One explanation could be the fear of the unknowns and the hassle that could accompany the new
extended jury proceedings.”) (Aug. 19, 2004) (quoting section by Ronald Wright); cf. Jennifer Sullivan, Seattle
Teens Won’t Face Exceptional Sentences, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at B2 (noting that for undisclosed
reasons prosecutors “backed off a plan to seek exceptional sentences against two Seattle teens accused of
killing a fellow Roosevelt High School classmate”). However, at the 2004 annual conference of the National
Association of State Sentencing Commissions, Judge Richard Walker of Kansas “discounted the possibility
that the additional hassle of using the sentencing jury was a deterrent” to prosecutors. Focus on the States—A
Report from New Mexico (Aug. 19, 2004), at http://blakelyblog.blogspot.com/2004/08/focus-on-states-reportfrom-new-mexico.html.
223 As Professor Ronald Wright reports, “In most counties, there have been none at all; statewide, there
may have been less than a half dozen.” Spanning the States, Sentencing Law and Policy, at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/08/spanning_the_st.html (Aug. 19, 2004).
224 Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 65 (citation omitted).
220

CHANENSON GALLEYS7

2005]

4/21/2005 10:00 AM

THE NEXT ERA OF SENTENCING REFORM

425

the facts necessary to authorize an enhanced sentence beyond a reasonable
doubt, it seems logical that defendants will be less likely to accept such
“enhanced” pleas.
Furthermore, when evaluating what may be lost—in terms of reasonable
individualization and relative proportionality—by reducing upward departure
sentences, it is not appropriate to think only about the number of upward
departures granted. We also need to consider how many times a prosecutor
sought an upward departure that the judge declined to impose. Comparing the
success of departure requests before and after Blakely-ization may reveal an
odd pattern. While the number of aggravated departures granted may fall, the
percentage of such enhancements granted (deserved or not) may rise sharply.
Once a jury has given its stamp of approval to an enhanced sentence, it is
asking a great deal of any judge, particularly an elected judge, to exercise her
discretion and deny that departure. No doubt judges denied these kinds of
upward departures regularly under the previous system despite the existence of
judicially found facts, but in that system, the judge was in control of the entire
process. Once the jury finds the necessary facts, there is pressure on the judge
to sentence more severely. The strength of that pressure may vary and is open
to debate, but it is difficult to say it will be nonexistent.
Systemic pressure is likely as well. With fewer upward departures, it is
inevitable that some more serious offenses and offenders will receive less
severe sentences than in the past. This may lead to calls for an increase of the
maximum in the presumptive range for the typical case. Although Kansas, at
least for now, has avoided the impulse to increase all sentences, the push to
increase sentences across the board will be irresistible in some jurisdictions.225
Without the judicial flexibility to impose a more severe sentence for an
unusually serious permutation of an offense, it is only logical that at least some
legislators will agitate to shift the entire system up a notch or two in severity,
thus ensuring sufficient punishment for the unusually serious, headlinegrabbing offense. The traditional presumptive guidelines approach does not
suffer from this limitation because it allows judges, to varying degrees, to
increase sentences when appropriate without shifting the entire range of
punishment upward. An approach reflecting a balance between uniformity and
225 See, e.g., ANNE SKOVE, BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE COURTS 8 (2004), at
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/kis_sentenblakely.pdf (noting that “a state could rearrange its
‘presumptive’ guidelines to comport with Blakely. Under this plan, a state could increase the presumptive
range to include room for what were once ‘departures.’ Thus, no additional findings of fact would be
necessary. At least two states (Arizona and Tennessee) have considered such a change.”).
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individualization may often achieve several goals. It may allow judges to
respond to unusually egregious circumstances with more severe sentences.
Simultaneously, it may maintain relative proportionality and limit the risk of
general sentence creep for the more typical offense.
Furthermore, the question remains: What facts can be the basis of an
upward departure?
In Kansas, the list of aggravating factors is
“nonexclusive.”226 In other words, the prosecutor or the judge can create
nonstatutory aggravating factors and, if the jury finds them beyond a
reasonable doubt, use those factors to justify an enhanced sentence. This
practice appears suspect after Blakely. Under these circumstances, arguably
judges—not the legislature—are defining the offense. If the manner in which
the offense is committed (for example, with deliberate cruelty as in Blakely
itself) increases the Blakely statutory maximum, the defendant should have
notice of that functional “element” of the offense—in the form of a statute or at
least a sentencing guideline—before he commits the crime.227 How is the
prospective felon to know whether the manner in which he commits the crime
will be a ground for a sentence enhancement?
This idea follows logically from the majority’s opinion in Apprendi and its
progeny. The use of nonstatutory aggravating factors deprives defendants of
the right, presumably, to choose whether to commit the crime in this more
egregious fashion.228 Thus, Blakely-izing will encourage a sentencing
commission (or legislature) to define the entire universe of possible departure
reasons.229 The result will likely be a system that is either underinclusive of
such factors (resulting in more sentences that may be inappropriately low and
226

KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4716(c)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000) (“Put simply, facts that expose a defendant
to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal
offense.”).
228 Cf. Bibas, supra note 105, at 340 (“If the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines stand, then Blakely makes
each and every Guidelines enhancement, upward departure, or relevant conduct into an element of the offense.
Put another way, Blakely shatters the criminal code into millions of pieces.”) (emphasis added); Bowman,
supra note 182, at 365 (asserting that the Blakely-izing approach “would transform every possible combination
of statutory elements and guidelines sentencing elements into a separate ‘crime’ for Sixth Amendment
purposes”).
229 Even if the courts do not conclude that aggravating factors must be legislatively codified, legislatures
may feel compelled to further codify these aggravating circumstances because some judges are already
reporting that they “might become less inclined to create new non-statutory aggravating circumstances, out of
concern for how juries will carry out the factfinding in unknown territory. Similarly, the judges would be less
likely to approve non-statutory aggravating circumstances if proposed by the prosecutor.” Posts from Ron
from NASC, Sentencing Law and Policy, at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/
08/emblakelyem_all.html (Aug. 20, 2004) (posting by Ronald Wright).
227
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inducing an effort to raise all sentence lengths) or overinclusive and provides
almost meaninglessly broad factors (resulting in more sentences that may be
inappropriately high because the departure grounds are not narrowly tailored).
Regardless, the system is liable to be unbalanced, thus diminishing the utility
of the departure power.
A fully developed departure power acts as an important safety valve in
properly balanced, presumptive guidelines sentencing schemes. Blakely-izing
presumptive sentencing guidelines sharply limits the functionality of this safety
valve. What may have replaced that safety valve in Kansas is the unguided use
of the more opaque and less nuanced tool of concurrent and consecutive
sentences. Minnesota has taken a more logical approach to its concurrent and
consecutive sentences decisions and provided guidance, but that choice only
serves to highlight the problems with limiting departure power.
The “pressure” that the safety valve in a fully developed departure power
relieves is the pressure a presumptive sentencing guidelines system places on
judges to sentence higher or lower than they believe is appropriate in a
particular case, considering the purposes of sentencing.230 The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission recently stated that it “strongly believes
that preserving aggravated departures is necessary to ensure public safety and
provide for appropriate sentencing when aggravated factors related to an
offense are present and an enhanced sentence is in the interest of justice.”231
We want presumptive sentencing guidelines to bind judges in an effort to
obtain reasonable uniformity and relative proportionality in the system as a
whole. In the context of fully advisory guidelines, the dangers of weak or
nonexistent boundaries on a judge’s discretion are clear. Yet too little
discretion can also be destructive. A well-developed departure power fosters a
healthy balance between reasonable uniformity and reasonable
individualization while striving to maintain relative proportionality.232

230 See John H. Kramer & Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Downward Departures for Serious Violent Offenders: Local
Court “Corrections” to Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 897, 925 (2002)
(“Guidelines can provide a benchmark for courts, but there are distinct limitations to their ability to capture the
full complexity of individual cases.”); cf. ALABAMA SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT A4,
available at http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/publications/ASC%202004%20final%20report.pdf
(noting that the Commission expects that “25 percent of all cases will fall outside of the suggested range” of its
proposed voluntary guidelines).
231 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, supra note 220, at 78.
232 Kramer & Ulmer, supra note 230, at 925 (“Departures reflect the use of discretion to ‘correct’
guidelines. The ‘corrections’ may indicate offense behavior that is less serious than reflected in the guideline
ranking, or factors not considered in the guidelines, but viewed as important to the court at sentencing.”).
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2. Concurrent—Consecutive Issues
One possible reason why Kansas has been able to Blakely-ize its guidelines
without an immediate increase in overall sentence severity is that judges retain
the essentially unguided power to impose sentences concurrently or
consecutively. Thus, roughly similar defendants convicted of roughly similar
offenses may receive wildly disparate sentences simply because of the
unguided, discretionary application of concurrent or consecutive sentences. In
the absence of any direction from the sentencing commission, judges may
functionally evade the guidelines.
Judge Richard Walker, an expert on Kansas sentencing, recently confirmed
that Kansas prosecutors can avoid sentencing juries and still get aggravated
sentences by seeking consecutive sentences.233 Thus, it is unsurprising that
Professor Ronald Wright reported that, in Kansas, “[p]rosecutors have begun
more actively to charge additional counts, making possible these consecutive
terms. For example, drug deals can also be charged as conspiracies and/or
violations of the drug tax law.”234 Put differently, judges need not bother with
jury factfinding or bifurcated trials in order to impose lengthy sentences on
deserving defendants; they can simply order the sentences for multiple counts
to run consecutively. Unfortunately, the Kansas Sentencing Commission does
not provide guidance to the judge in the exercise of this power.235 Within
broad limits, Kansas judges exercise unguided discretion whether to impose a
consecutive sentence up to twice as long as that called for by the most serious
offense.236 Thus, by restricting the relatively transparent departure power that
was in place before Blakely-ization, Kansas has pushed the more opaque
discretionary decision to impose a consecutive sentence into greater use.
For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas rebuffed a defendant’s claim
that the judge improperly bypassed jury factfinding required by Apprendi (and
233 Focus on the States—A Report from New Mexico, at http://blakelyblog.blogspot.com/2004/08/focuson-states-report-from-new-mexico.html (Aug. 19, 2004) (reporting Judge Walker’s point that “if an extended
sentence is desired, [District Attorneys] can easily move for the imposition of consecutive sentences under
Kansas’s procedural rules. Often this method can be used to obtain increased sentences instead of separate
jury factfinding.”).
234 Spanning the States, Sentencing Law and Policy, at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_
and_policy/2004/08/spanning_the_st.html (Aug. 19, 2004) (posting by Ronald Wright).
235 Cf. KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4608(a) (West Supp. 2004) (“When separate sentences of
imprisonment for different crimes are imposed on a defendant on the same date . . . such sentences shall run
concurrently or consecutively as the court directs.”); cf. id. (discussing certain situations when sentences shall
run consecutively).
236 See State v. Bramlett, 41 P.3d 796, 797 (Kan. 2002).
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now Blakely) by imposing consecutive sentences.237 Furthermore, the sentence
was not subject to appellate review because the individual sentences were
within the presumptive guidelines range. In other words, Kansas judges can
still easily impose more severe sentences in cases with multiple offenses.
Although this ability existed pre-Apprendi, there is now an incentive to use it
more often. By using their power to sentence consecutively, judges are able to
impose these more severe sentences, not only without the burden of jury
factfinding, but also without the heightened transparency of an appealable
departure sentence. In the absence of meaningful regulation of this
discretionary concurrent versus consecutive decision, Kansas’s system
becomes more individualized and less likely to achieve relative
proportionality.
Unlike the Kansas system, the Minnesota sentencing guidelines do provide
for some guidance concerning concurrent versus consecutive sentences. The
Minnesota approach groups offenses into three categories—presumptively
concurrent, presumptively consecutive, and discretionary.238 Judges who
deviate from the presumptive disposition depart from the guidelines.239 This
treatment of concurrent and consecutive sentences is much more attractive and
principled than the Kansas scheme. Before Blakely, the Minnesota model also
worked well because the judge, based on written justifications subject to
appellate review, could depart, dispensing with the presumption of either a
concurrent or consecutive sentence when appropriate. If Minnesota Blakelyizes its sentencing guidelines, judges would likely have to base any move from
presumptive concurrent to presumptive consecutive sentences on facts
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.240
237

Id.
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 80, § II.F, at 34–37.
239 While Justice Breyer would disapprove of this approach as too blunt and categorical, it does afford a
decent amount of guidance without making the rules too complex, which is a criticism leveled at the relevant
provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 26 (1988).
240 When the decision whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence is left to the discretion of
the sentencing judge, it seems as though there is no Blakely problem. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 2004 WL
2671619, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2004) (concluding that Apprendi and Blakely “have no application
to a judge’s consecutive sentencing determination,” and endorsing the “time-honored view that, once
convictions and the lengths of individual sentences are determined, the judge is the arbiter of whether the
sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively”); People v. Sykes, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 326–27 (Cal. App.
2004); cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000) (noting that it was irrelevant to the Sixth
Amendment question at issue in Apprendi that the defendant could have been sentenced to just as much time in
prison without the increased term had other sentences been imposed consecutively instead of concurrently);
Impact of Blakely v. Washington on Tennessee’s Sentencing Scheme, 04-131 Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 4 (2004)
238
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This raises all of the problems, discussed above, with the stunted, post-Blakely
departure power.
3. Blakely-izing the Feds?
Thus far, the discussion of Blakely-izing guidelines systems has covered
state systems like Kansas and Minnesota where the transition to a Blakely-ized
system would be relatively easy. It is also possible to Blakely-ize the current
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. However, the federal system’s extensive
reliance on judicial factfinding to set even the presumptive sentencing range,
let alone to depart from that range, would make such a transition difficult.241
One option would create a stripped-down version of the guidelines that reduces
the number of facts (now to be found by the jury) needed to reach the
presumptive range, and then allow jury authorized departures.242
Professor Mark Osler, in his provocative article, The Blakely Problem and
the 3x Solution, suggested this type of option.243 To allow more flexibility, he
proposes to “[s]uper-size the Guideline ranges to three times their current size
(thus the ‘3x solution’).”244 This will “allow judges to continue to exercise
discretion and engage in judicial fact-finding, while maintaining some limits
on the effect of disparities between fact-finders.”245 Unfortunately, the
resulting presumptive ranges could be so large, particularly at higher offense
levels, as to throw into question both reasonable uniformity and
proportionality. While this approach would attempt to counteract some of the
(stating that “[w]hile the imposition of consecutive sentences, in practice, lengthens the actual amount of time
a defendant serves, it does not increase the punishment for any individual offense”). But see People v. Black,
2004 Cal. LEXIS 6905, at *1 (Cal. July 28, 2004) (granting petition for review and directing parties to brief
two issues, including “[w]hat effect does Blakely have on the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences?”).
If a factual finding were required to impose a consecutive sentence that would otherwise run
concurrently, the standard Blakely rules would seem to apply. The Minnesota Commission notes that a slight
statutory change is required to ensure that this approach, which differentiates the groups of offenses by
whether they are “person” offenses, survives Blakely. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, supra
note 220, at 79–80.
241 See, e.g., United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1243 (D. Utah 2004).
242 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Rachel E. Barkow), available at
http://www.blakelyblog.com/Testimony%20Barkow.pdf.
243 Osler, supra note 197, at 344.
244 Id. Professor Osler recommends ranges of “either 18 months or 75% of the bottom of the range,
whichever is higher.” Id. at 345. Of course, as Professor Osler notes, this “would affect all ranges except
those mandating life sentences, which would remain the same.” Id. at 347 n.12 (presumably referring to Level
43).
245 Id. at 345.
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damage done by the loss of a fully developed departure system, it still comes at
a high cost.
Some might reasonably object to these supersized ranges because they
would allow judges to sentence lower level offenders more harshly within the
now broader range. Conversely, others might reasonably object because the
supersized ranges may, at times, still yield sentences that some perceive to be
too low. For example, under Professor Osler’s plan, a five kilogram cocaine
dealer would face a presumptive range of 121–212 months, which is up to
sixty-one more months than under the current approach.246 The 150-plus
kilogram dealer would also face 121–212 months, as opposed to the 235–293
months he would face under the current regime.247 This is not meant to
criticize Professor Osler, who produced a fine proposal. Rather, it is meant to
highlight the difficulties inherent in crafting a balanced sentencing system
without a fully developed departure power.248
The Blakely-izing option, while conforming to Blakely, is sorely lacking as
a sentencing model. In some of its various possible permutations, the Blakelyizing option may provide for too much judicial discretion which will lead to
increased (and perhaps invidious) disparity, or it may afford too little
discretion and produce substantial upward pressure on all sentences. Kansas
has thus far resisted the pressure to increase severity across the board by
keeping the more opaque tool of discretionary, consecutive sentencing.
Minnesota seems likely to restrict its departure power while keeping its curbs
on concurrent and consecutive decisions. Neither option is particularly
attractive. Kansas is merely driving largely unregulated discretion further

246

Id.
Id. Professor Osler does suggest that Blakely-compliant upward departures be available in cases of “an
especially large quantity of narcotics.” Id. at 246. Of course, this presents all of the difficulties of using juries
to find facts that Professor Osler himself describes. Id. (noting that a “shift to jury findings of aggravating
factors . . . could create a quandary for the courts”).
248 A Blakely-ized system will also have a limited ability to fully address conduct occurring in multiple
judicial districts or long-running schemes uncovered after some of the early events are beyond the statute of
limitations. In an unguided system, judges properly could and did look at all the facts about the offense and
the offender. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Within their discretion, this information was then
taken into account in imposing the sentence. The problem in the unguided system (determinate or
indeterminate) was that the discretion to alter the sentence for whatever reason was too vast and effectively
unreviewable. One of the significant problems with the pre-Blakely Federal Sentencing Guidelines is that,
contrary to the prior regime, sentencing judges were required to increase sentences based on these other facts,
like relevant conduct. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 159–60 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247
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underground. Minnesota will be allowing upward pressure to build in its
system that may erupt in a variety of unpleasant ways.249
These results, though unfortunate, are unsurprising. Without the ability to
establish structural mechanisms such as transparent and fully developed
judicial departures to individualize sentences when appropriate, legislatures
will view some sentences as disproportionately low. Their suspicions will be
confirmed when, as will undoubtedly happen, a judge declares that she would
have imposed a more severe sentence if only allowed to do so. It may just take
one such case for a legislature to broaden the sentencing ranges radically,
inviting unreviewable disparity, or to increase all sentences, impacting every
defendant regardless of culpability.
Overall, Blakely-ized presumptive guidelines are still likely to be superior
to the completely unguided systems of old. They will provide guidance for the
majority of typical cases. Yet these replacement sentencing guidelines will be
a mere shadow of the pre-Blakely presumptive guidelines with fully developed
departure powers. As a result, justice will suffer.
IV. THE NEXT ERA UNFOLDS
There is a way to provide meaningful and fully responsive sentencing
guidelines after Blakely. A system of Indeterminate Structured Sentencing,
which improves on classic indeterminate sentencing, both avoids a return to
the “bad old days”250 of unguided, indeterminate sentencing and is Blakelycompliant. Remaining true to sentencing’s first principles, ISS may well usher
in the next era of sentencing reform. While this system, aspects of which are
practiced in such states as Pennsylvania and Michigan, is not perfect, it may be
the best bet in the post-Blakely age.
A model ISS system has two key, coordinated components: (1) complete
presumptive sentencing guidelines and (2) a reconceptualized form of parole

249

Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 975 (noting that “political pressure to ensure higher penalties will
likely produce a more severe, determinate sentencing system”); The Power of the Headline Making Crime,
Sentencing Law and Policy (“[T]he latest news from Minnesota highlights that even this state can have its
sentencing policy influenced greatly by one headline-making crime.”) (posting by Douglas A. Berman), at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentenceing_law_and_policy/2005/01/the_power_of_th.html (Jan. 6, 2005).
250 108 CONG. REC. S8573 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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release authority that is both modest in mission and guided in practice.251 At
the center of the ISS system is a “Super Commission” that promulgates both
sentencing guidelines and parole release guidelines. This Super Commission
has all the qualities of the best traditional sentencing commission but possesses
expanded powers to channel back-end parole release authority as well as frontend sentencing authority. The combination of robust, presumptive sentencing
guidelines and guided parole release authority works to pursue just results for
individual defendants while coordinating the sentencing and release policies of
the jurisdiction.
By definition, the ISS approach includes discretionary parole release
authority.252 As a result, judges operating under an ISS system impose a
“minimum” and a “maximum” sentence—for example, two to four years. ISS
presumptive sentencing guidelines address only the judge’s imposition of the
minimum term, not the maximum term. Typically, the minimum sentence
must be no more than some percentage of the maximum sentence in order to
allow for an adequate period of potential postrelease supervision.253 For
example, in Pennsylvania, the minimum sentence typically cannot exceed onehalf of the maximum sentence.254 This so-called “min-max rule” would permit
a sentence of two to four years, but not one of two to three years. The judge’s
ability to impose a maximum sentence up to and including the traditional
statutory maximum for the offense of conviction is unconstrained.255 The
251

As noted above, presumptive sentencing guidelines have been described as “sentencing guidelines that
require a judge to impose the recommended (presumptive) sentence or one within a recommended range, or
provide justification for imposing a different sentence.” Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 61.
252 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
253 It is important to emphasize that I view postrelease supervision—under whatever moniker—as
valuable (at least in theory). Although far beyond the scope of this Article, postrelease supervision is
important but has had its own share of problems and critics. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner
Reentry in the United States, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 479, 499–500 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1999) (“The major criticisms of parole release . . . were also levied at field supervision and caused
major changes and reforms there as well.”). Done properly, postrelease supervision can provide benefits both
to the offender and society not only by maintaining supervision but also by encouraging meaningful
reintegration (or perhaps initial integration) into the community. See, e.g., id. at 522 (discussing new model
that “involve[s] strengthening parole’s links with law enforcement and the community offering a ‘full-service’
model of parole and attempting to change the offenders’ lives through personal, family, and neighborhood
interventions . . . . [In this new model,] agents are responsible for close supervision as well as procuring jobs,
social support, and needed treatment.”).
254 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9756(b) (1998) (“The court shall impose a minimum sentence of
confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed.”). There are certain
circumstances in Pennsylvania when the minimum sentence can exceed one-half of the maximum sentence.
255 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pugh, 67 Pa. D. & C. 4th 458, 463 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (“The
maximum is set by the trial judge but cannot exceed the maximum set by law. The minimum is based on
guideline ranges under the sentencing guidelines.”) (citation omitted); PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON
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maximum sentence, which of course cannot exceed the traditional, legislatively
created statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, is the most time an
offender can be required to spend in prison or, once released, on parole
supervision.256 The minimum sentence is the least amount of time an offender
will spend in prison.257 A defendant will be eligible for parole release at the
expiration of his minimum sentence, but it will be the parole board—
exercising its discretion as guided by the Super Commission—that decides
precisely when to release the inmate on parole.258
Under the ISS method, the Super Commission acts as the central
coordinator of the jurisdiction’s sentencing and punishment policy. The Super
Commission is thus able to harmonize otherwise potentially conflicting
sentencing and parole release principles. As discussed below, ideal ISS
sentencing guidelines embody a balance between reasonable uniformity and
reasonable individualization while allowing a good chance of a relatively
proportional sentencing result. This is possible, in part, because of bounded
judicial discretion policed by appellate court review.
Through ISS parole release guidelines, the Super Commission directs the
exercise of the discretionary parole release authority in such a way as to reduce
the complaints of the past while taking advantage of the possibilities of the
future. The parole release guidelines direct the exercise of the parole board’s
discretionary release decision, and usually work to channel the board’s
discretion in favor of releasing inmates at or near the expiration of their
minimum sentence. The fact that the Super Commission guides the board’s
discretion is just one crucial feature. It is also vital that the board exercises
that discretion openly, with appropriate process, and subject to some form of
SENTENCING, ANNUAL REPORT 1980–1981, at 14 (1981) (“When considering guideline incarceration lengths,
the Commission decided to set the minimum sentence and to defer establishment of the maximum sentence to
the Court.”).
256 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9756(a) (Supp. 2004). This statutory maximum also limits the amount
of time a defendant can spend on probation, either as the sole means of a sentence or as part of a so-called
“split sentence.” See, e.g., id. § 9754 et seq. (1998 & Supp. 2004); cf. Stallsmith v. Pa. Dept. of Corrections,
846 A.2d 191, 192–93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (noting that “split sentence” refers to incarceration and
probation imposed on the same count of conviction).
257 The ISS model does not engage in the old practice common in many indeterminate jurisdictions of
releasing inmates long before they served their judicially announced sentences. Reflecting a form of “truth in
sentencing,” a defendant sentenced under ISS is not granted so-called “early” parole release.
258 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21(a) (West 1999). In Pennsylvania, if the maximum sentence
is less than two years, the inmate is not sent to state prison, and the judge is the paroling authority. The judge,
unlike the parole board, may parole an inmate at any time, including immediately upon imposition of sentence.
This interesting feature of Pennsylvania’s sentencing scheme warrants further exploration, but is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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review.259 Ultimately, in part because of our limited ability to predict future
behavior, we should be humble in our conception of the power and proper
scope of parole release authority.
The combination of complete and balanced presumptive sentencing
guidelines and coordinated parole release guidelines (as part of a restructured
conception of parole release authority) yields a Blakely-compliant ISS system
that should be attractive to legislatures and judges alike.
A. ISS Sentencing Guidelines
Presumptive sentencing guidelines in an ISS approach would be largely
familiar to most pre-Blakely consumers of such systems. Ideally, these
guidelines would provide both meaningful direction from the Super
Commission and meaningful discretion for a sentencing judge in setting the
minimum sentence.260 As the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
declared, “The purpose of guidelines is to assist the judge and to reduce
disparity, not to remove judicial discretion, creativity and wisdom.”261
These ISS presumptive sentencing guidelines would encompass several
important attributes, including: (1) bounded judicial discretion within the
presumptive standard sentencing range, (2) mitigated and aggravated

259

Professor Reitz notes that parole boards have an ignominious history of poor process and patronage
appointments. Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of Parole Release Authority, in THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, supra note 12, at 199, 228. The ISS approach would change all of that, which is,
admittedly, no small task. Id. at 228–29 (“It is always easy to say that more qualified persons should therefore
be recruited to the task, but criminal justice reform is most likely to founder when it is built on the assumption
that the human capital within the system can be dramatically improved.”). The imposition of guidelines
through a Super Commission will help to implement the needed reform. The improvement in personnel is
more likely to occur when the system becomes transparent and structured.
260 For example, although they reflect a less-than-perfect variation on the ideal ISS sentencing approach,
the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines “were designed to constrain, but not eliminate, discretion in
sentencing.” David Holleran & Cassia Spohn, On the Use of the Total Incarceration Variable in Sentencing
Research, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 211, 216 (2004); see also Commonwealth v. Moore, 617 A.2d 8, 12 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (noting that the “[s]entencing court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible
confinements which best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his crime”).
261 PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1980). The Commission also
noted that it “will rely on the sentencing judge to examine the guidelines and then to assure fairness in
sentencing by determining whether the guideline is appropriate in a particular case, and, if not, to enumerate
why not and go outside the guidelines.” Id. This approach of respecting judicial discretion (in fact, according
to some, being too deferential to judicial discretion) remains a part of the Pennsylvania guidelines today. As
such, it stands in stark contrast to the path most recently taken by the U.S. Congress in enacting the PROTECT
Act. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (“PROTECT
Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
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sentencing ranges, (3) guidance concerning concurrent and consecutive
sentences, (4) a fully developed departure power, and (5) meaningful review
by appellate courts.
Judicial sentencing under the ISS scheme satisfies the Sixth Amendment as
interpreted in Blakely. The critical component is the combination of (1)
indeterminate sentencing (with parole release authority), and (2) presumptive
sentencing guidelines that govern only the minimum sentence. The sentencing
judge may impose a maximum sentence up to the traditional statutory
maximum based exclusively on the jury’s authorization (or the defendant’s
plea) inherent in the guilty verdict. As such, in the ISS system, the traditional
statutory maximum is the same as the Blakely statutory maximum. Both are, in
the Blakely Court’s words, the “maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.”262 Blakely, in fact, specifically permitted the kind of judicial
factfinding required in the ISS scheme. Justice Scalia approved of judicial
factfinding concerning the discretionary imposition of a maximum sentence.263
He noted that indeterminate sentencing264 involves judicial factfinding, but
“the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser
sentence—and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement
upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.”265
For example, Pennsylvania’s basic sentencing structure266 satisfies
Blakely,267 and is compatible with much, but not all, of the ISS sentencing

262

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
Id. at 2538.
264 As discussed above, it is possible that Justice Scalia was imprecise with his use of language and was
really referring to unguided, discretionary sentencing schemes. For the purpose of determining ISS’s
compliance with Blakely, that point is immaterial. Regardless of his terminology, Justice Scalia focused on the
maximum sentence that could be imposed. Under the ISS approach, the maximum sentence that may be
imposed by the sentencing judge—totally within the judge’s discretion and based solely on the conviction
(jury verdict or guilty plea)—is the traditional statutory maximum set forth in the criminal code.
265 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (emphasis in original).
266 Pennsylvania’s parole release practice is quite different from the ISS model. In Pennsylvania, the
parole board sets parole release policy for state prisoners and does so independently from the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing. In fact, Pennsylvania reflects the dangers of uncoordinated sentencing and parole
release policies. See infra note 314.
267 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172, 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“As opposed to the
determinate guidelines of Washington State at issue in Blakely, the Pennsylvania guidelines are indeterminate
and Blakely is not applicable here . . . . Pennsylvania utilizes an indeterminate sentencing scheme with
presumptive sentencing guidelines which limit the judge’s discretion only concerning the minimum
sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598, 602–03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Commonwealth v.
Pugh, 67 Pa. D. & C. 4th 458, 463 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (“[T]he Pennsylvania system is unaffected by the
263
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approach.
Pennsylvania’s presumptive sentencing guidelines—like ISS
presumptive sentencing guidelines—only impact the minimum sentence and
the judge may, in her discretion, impose a maximum sentence up to the
traditional statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.268 Furthermore,
Pennsylvania courts have held that the maximum sentence is the real
sentence.269 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated, “[T]he
maximum term represents the sentence imposed for a criminal offense, with
the minimum term merely setting the date after which a prisoner may be
paroled.”270 By not regulating the judge’s discretion to impose the maximum
(or real) sentence, Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines—like the sentencing
aspect of ISS—do not run afoul of Blakely.271
holding in Blakely that was designed to protect the defendant from a higher maximum sentence based on facts
not found by the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”).
268 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 675 A.2d 268, 277 n.17 (Pa. 1996) (“It is well-established that
a sentencing court can impose a sentence that is the maximum period authorized by the statute.”) (citation
omitted); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“[T]he sentencing guidelines
provide for minimum and not maximum sentences . . . .”) (citation omitted); id. at 153–54 (affirming
consecutive sentences with a minimum sentence within the standard range of the guidelines and a maximum
sentence at the statutory maximum for the offenses of conviction); id. at 154 (“Appellant’s argument that the
sentences are excessive cannot stand. The trial court did not impose impermissibly excessive maximum
sentences, as they are the maximum terms provided by the statutes of our Commonwealth.”) (citations
omitted). But see id. at 156 (Klein, J., dissenting) (“Under these circumstances, I believe sentencing a nineteen
year old defendant to a 100 year maximum sentence is excessive.”).
269 Krantz v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 483 A.2d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (“We begin our
analysis with the fact that under Pennsylvania law, the sentence imposed for a criminal offense is the
maximum term. The minimum term merely sets the date prior to which a prisoner may not be paroled.”)
(citation omitted); Gundy v. Commonwealth, 478 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (“The sentence
imposed for a criminal offense is the maximum sentence and the minimum sentence merely sets the date prior
to which a prisoner may not be paroled.”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth ex rel. Nornhold v. Day, 67
Dauph. 1, 2 (Pa. C. 1954) (“A sentence for an indefinite term is deemed to be a sentence for the maximum
term.”); see also Eccles v. Pa. Bd. of Parole, 65 Dauph. 50, 52 (Pa. C. 1953) (“The maximum sentence . . . is
the only portion of the sentence which has legal validity. The minimum sentence is merely an administrative
notice by the Court to the executive department, calling attention to the legislative policy that, when a
prisoner’s so-called minimum sentence is about to or has expired, the question of grace and mercy ought to be
considered and the propriety of granting a qualified pardon be determined.”).
270 Martin v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 840 A.2d 299, 302 (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Rogers
v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 321 n.2 (Pa. 1999) (The “minimum term imposed on a prison
sentence merely sets the date prior to which a prisoner may not be paroled.”) (emphasis in original).
271 But see Wool & Stemen, supra note 5, at 63 (arguing that it is unclear whether Blakely applies to the
Michigan and Pennsylvania systems, which are variations on the ISS approach); id. (“Indeed, it is possible to
construct equally compelling arguments that Blakely does or does not apply.”). Although Wool and Stemen’s
piece is excellent overall and reflects some of the most insightful thinking about Blakely to date, they are
simply wrong to assert that Blakely may damage a guided indeterminate jurisdiction like Michigan or
Pennsylvania. Wool and Stemen question whether the “effective maximum sentence,” which they define as
“the maximum sentence authorized for an offense based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant,” is the minimum term or the maximum term, which is limited solely by the
statutory maximum punishment for the offense of conviction. Id. at 61. In Pennsylvania, the answer is clear.
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A defendant committing a crime knows that he is entitled to no more than
the traditional statutory maximum set by the legislature for the offense of
conviction.272 Thus, the ISS approach remains viable even using the Supreme
Court’s new definition of a Blakely statutory maximum.273
The Michigan Supreme Court recently confirmed that its own sentencing
approach, which is similar for Sixth Amendment purposes to the sentencing
features of ISS, survives Blakely. Michigan uses legislatively created
guidelines to structure the imposition of minimum sentences and, in many
cases, automatically assigns the offense’s traditional statutory maximum as the

As noted above, Pennsylvania courts have long held that the maximum sentence imposed is the true sentence.
As Wool and Stemen properly note, the guidelines provide no limitation on the maximum sentence, and it is
capped solely by the statutory maximum sentence as traditionally understood. In other words, pursuant to
long-standing Pennsylvania law, the unguided, discretionary maximum sentence imposed is the relevant
sentence for Blakely purposes. Given that there is no limitation other than that set by the legislature for the
offense of conviction, Blakely does not interfere with the way sentencing was conducted in Pennsylvania
before June 24, 2004. Similarly, the ISS approach survives Blakely.
272 Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004). In his Apprendi concurrence, Justice Scalia
emphasized the importance of this kind of notice to the potential criminal:
I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is
exposing himself to a jail sentence of 30 years—and that if, upon conviction, he gets anything
less than that he may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge (just as he may thank the mercy of
a tenderhearted parole commission if he is let out inordinately early, or the mercy of a
tenderhearted governor if his sentence is commuted). Will there be disparities? Of course. But
the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime, and his
guilt of the crime (and hence the length of the sentence to which he is exposed) will be
determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow citizens.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The ISS
approach does not offend this principle. Rather, by each defendant knowing that he or she may be incarcerated
until the full expiration of his or her legislatively authorized sentence based on each offense of conviction, it
provides the clearest of notice to all potential criminals.
273 See, e.g., People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 286 n.14 (Mich. 2004); Commonwealth v. Smith, 863
A.2d 1172, 1178–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). Given that the Blakely “statutory maximum” and the legislature’s
“statutory maximum” converge under the ISS system, the ability to use presumptive guidelines to channel
judicial discretion concerning the minimum sentence seems unassailable. As the Supreme Court in Apprendi
noted:
We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to
exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and
offender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted
that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence
within statutory limits in the individual case.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (emphasis in original). As the Court noted in Harris v. United States, “[j]udicial
factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence within the authorized range does not implicate the indictment,
jury-trial, and reasonable-doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2000).
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maximum sentence.274 In People v. Claypool, the Michigan Supreme Court, in
dicta, observed that the minimum sentence is based on guidelines while the
“maximum is not determined by the trial judge but is set by law.”275
“Accordingly, the Michigan system is unaffected by the holding in Blakely that
was designed to protect the defendant from a higher sentence based on facts
not found by the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”276
Similar to the tops-off approach, the ISS sentencing system complies with
both the spirit and the letter of the Sixth Amendment as understood after
Blakely.277 Relying on the minimum-maximum distinction to keep ISS
274 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.8(1) (2000) (“The maximum penalty provided by law shall be the
maximum sentence in all cases except as provided in this chapter and shall be stated by the judge in imposing
the sentence.”); id. § 768.9(2) (“In all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion of the court may be
imprisonment for life or any number or term of years, the court may impose a sentence for life or may impose
a sentence for any term of years. If the sentence imposed by the court is for any term of years, the court shall
fix both the minimum and the maximum of that sentence in terms of years or fraction thereof . . . .”); id.
§ 768.9(3) (discussing similar approach for major controlled substance offense “for which the court is directed
by law to impose a sentence which cannot be less than a specified term of years nor more than a specified term
of years”). When the law does not automatically set the maximum sentence, the judge sets the maximum
sentence within the legislatively established limits for the offense of conviction. Id. This sentencing approach,
while similar to the sentencing aspect of ISS, falls short of the ideal ISS system in part because the sentencing
court cannot always exercise its discretion to set the maximum sentence. As such, for many defendants, the
traditional statutory maximum from the criminal code is the maximum sentence. A likely result is that at least
some maximum sentences are disproportionately high.
275 Claypool, 684 N.W.2d at 286 n.14; see also id. at 292 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“I also agree with the majority’s determination that [Blakely] does not appear to affect scoring
systems that establish recommended minimum sentences, such as we have in Michigan.”) (emphasis in
original); id. at 293–94 (“I concur in the majority’s conclusion that [Blakely], which considered whether facts
that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to
the jury, does not affect Michigan’s scoring system, which establishes the recommended minimum sentence.”)
(emphasis in original); id. at 291 (Corrigan, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although I agree
that Blakely does not implicate our sentencing scheme, the full scope of the Blakely decision has yet to be
determined. Given the response to Blakely, it appears likely that the issue of mandatory minimum sentences
will need to be settled.”) (citation omitted); cf. People v. Babcock, 666 N.W.2d 231, 236 n.7 (Mich. 2003) (“It
is only the minimum sentence that must presumptively be within the appropriate sentence range. M.C.L. §
769.34(2). The maximum sentence is either set by statute, e.g., the maximum sentence for extortion is twenty
years, M.C.L. § 750.213, or it falls within the judge’s discretion.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 769.8, 768.9.
276 Claypool, 684 N.W.2d at 286 n.14. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reached a similar
conclusion. Smith, 863 A.2d at 1178–79.
277 As noted, the defendant in an ISS system cannot be released before the expiration of the minimum
sentence, which can be set based in part on judicial factfinding. This aspect of ISS, like the tops-off approach,
relies on the continued viability of Harris. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. Although it is not
guaranteed, there are many reasons to expect Harris to survive the next wave of Supreme Court decisions. See
supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. Even if Harris falls, ISS sentencing can survive largely in tact by
making a simple but important change to its structure.
Without Harris, judges may not set minimum sentences of incarceration that must be served on the basis
of judicial factfinding. Under this anti-Harris approach, individuals sentenced under an ISS approach would
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systems beyond Blakely’s reach is neither a trick nor a gimmick. As Judge
Easterbrook noted in a related context, the Supreme Court would see “this not
as an ‘evasion’ but as a natural application of the Constitution.”278
Most forms of indeterminate sentencing survived Blakely unscathed. As
the Michigan Supreme Court observed, the Blakely majority “made clear that
the decision did not affect indeterminate sentencing systems.”279 Indeed, an
unguided, indeterminate sentencing scheme would also comply with Blakely.
Classic unguided, discretionary, indeterminate sentencing, however, comes at a
high price. It skews heavily toward extreme individualization at the expense of
reasonable uniformity and, relatedly, scores poorly on the proportionality
confidence index. The ISS method offers the benefit of being Blakelycompliant while still allowing for a balance of reasonable uniformity,
reasonable proportionality, and at least a medium high score on the
proportionality confidence index.
The ideal ISS sentencing guidelines reflect some of the best thinking from
the presumptive sentencing guidelines concept. This model approach also
includes features that were difficult to find even before Blakely. For example,
it would be devoid of mandatory minimum laws. Mandatory minimum
be statutorily eligible for parole release no later than the expiration of the top of the presumptive standard
range (set solely by the offense of conviction) unless the judge imposed a lower minimum sentence. In that
way, the judge is not “finding” any facts that would set a minimum sentence of incarceration that must be
served. The judge would continue to have the discretion to set the maximum sentence subject to the
individual’s release by the parole board. A minimum sentence within the aggravated range or a departure
above that range would not run afoul of the anti-Harris rule because it does not reflect the judge setting a
“minimum” sentence of incarceration that must be served. Effectively, it would be the judge making a parole
release recommendation to a parole board that is now legally empowered to release an individual no later than
the expiration of the top of the standard range (and earlier if the judicial minimum is set lower than the top of
the standard range). However, this judicial minimum recommendation is still going to be reviewable by the
appellate courts just like any other minimum sentence regardless of whether Harris survives. In this way, the
appellate court can continue to provide guidance.
In an ISS world without Harris, the parole board will still have its own Super Commission-written
guidelines channeling its discretion. Through these guidelines, the parole board will consider and give
substantial weight to the judge’s minimum sentence (parole release recommendation), but the board will be
legally able to release the prisoner at the expiration of the top of the presumptive standard range or the
minimum sentence actually imposed, whichever is lower.
This modified ISS approach, which complies with both Blakely and the hypothetical anti-Harris, will not
be as robust a defense against general sentence creep as the ISS Approach with Harris because the top of the
standard range is the only “guaranteed” sentence a defendant must serve. As such, some legislators might find
that to be inadequate and push for higher standard range sentences. However, parole release guidelines should
help to keep the parole board focused on what the trial judge found important, which may well result in the
minimum time actually served bearing a decent relationship to what the trial judge wanted.
278 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 519 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
279 Claypool, 684 N.W.2d at 286 n.14.
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penalties thwart the balanced exercise of judicial discretion and can lead to
increases in unwarranted uniformity and disproportionality.280 They also have
a distorting effect on the entire criminal justice system, including their ability
to extract guilty pleas.281 The ideal ISS sentencing system encourages, as do
Pennsylvania’s presumptive sentencing guidelines, the use of intermediate
punishments that are well-funded by the legislature.282 This exemplary system
also guides judges in selecting which form of intermediate punishment might
be appropriate. An ideal ISS system is unlikely to be achieved. Nevertheless,
an achievable ISS approach would be welcome.
A system reflecting the five important attributes of presumptive sentencing
guidelines in the ISS system enumerated above283 offers a balanced and
workable approach. First, the judge must start with the presumptive standard
range of the guidelines and justify on the record any movements from that
standard range.284 This is because the Super Commission in an ISS system—
like many traditional sentencing commissions—would create its presumptive
standard range by considering the seriousness of the typical offense.285 ISS

280 Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 58, 941–42 (“Mandatory minimums . . . represent everything that sentencing
guidelines are not.”); see also supra text accompanying note 204.
281 Cf. TONRY, supra note 37, at 191; Chanenson, supra note 43.
282 See MICHAEL TONRY, RECONSIDERING INDETERMINATE AND STRUCTURED SENTENCING 3 (1999); cf.
TONRY, supra note 37, at 192; Chanenson, supra note 43.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 261–62.
284 The sentencing judge must be careful not to conflate an exercise of discretion and a mere disagreement
with the guidelines. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently described this concern as follows:

If the sentencing court, under the guise of exercising its discretion, imposes a sentence that
deviates significantly from the guideline recommendations without a demonstration that the case
under consideration is compellingly different from the “typical” case of the same offense, or
without pointing to other sentencing factors that are germane to the case before the court,
including the character of the defendant or the defendant’s criminal history, then the court is not,
in reality, merely exercising its sentencing discretion. Rather, the court is, in effect, rejecting the
assessment of the Sentencing Commission as to what constitutes just punishment for a typical
commission of the crime in question.
Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152, 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); see also Commonwealth v. Vega, 850
A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Commonwealth v. Caraballo, 848 A.2d 1018 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). Much of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court’s increased focus on sentencing and appellate review of sentences, as manifested in such cases as Walls,
Caraballo, and Vega, is of recent vintage and is not always uniformly followed by other panels of the Superior
Court.
285 See, e.g., PA. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 303.13(a), Commentary, at 228 (5th ed. 1997) (“The
Commission cautions judges and others that the guidelines are written for the typical case and a standard
sentence may not provide fair results for the atypical case.”); Commonwealth v. Gause, 659 A.2d 1014, 1016
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[T]he guidelines provide the predesignated ranges of punishment for the offense
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presumptive sentencing guidelines, however, would afford judges a meaningful
amount of discretion to adjust the minimum sentence even within the
presumptive standard range. This does not mean that the judge’s discretion is
vast and unfettered;286 it simply means that there is breathing room. Although
judges are strongly encouraged to sentence within the standard range,287 the
guidelines acknowledge that the standard range will not always be
appropriate.288
Second, as an intermediate step between the presumptive standard range
and a departure sentence, the guidelines would also provide mitigated and
aggravated ranges for the minimum sentence.289 Judges may, in the exercise of
their discretion, sentence within the aggravated or mitigated range if they find
and document on the record aggravating or mitigating circumstances
warranting such a sentence.290 While the justification need not be as

considering the inherent egregiousness of the conduct which is generally associated with the commission of
that offense.”).
286 See, e.g., Walls, 846 A.2d at 154.
287 See, e.g., Gause, 659 A.2d at 1016 (“[U]nless the particular facts of the case in question are
distinguishable from the typical case of that same offense, a sentence in the standard range would be called
for.”).
288 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003) (allowing for departure from presumptive
sentencing range if “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described.”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2004)
(discussing departure standard); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 80, § II.D, at
24–25 (“When departing from the presumptive sentence, a judge must provide written reasons which specify
the substantial and compelling nature of the circumstances, and which demonstrate why the sentence selected
in the departure is more appropriate, reasonable, or equitable than the presumptive sentence.”); PA.
SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 303.13(a), Description, at 227 (“Although the standard range applies in
most instances, an aggravated sentence should be imposed when the court determines that there are
aggravating factors which are sufficiently important to warrant a sentence above the standard range
recommendation.”); id. § 303.13(b), Description, at 233 (“Although the standard range applies in most
instances, a mitigated sentence should be imposed when the court determines that there are mitigating factors
which are sufficiently important to warrant a sentence below the standard range recommendation.”).
289 See, e.g., PA. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 303.13(a) (discussing aggravated range sentence);
id. § 303.13(b) (discussing mitigated range sentence).
290 See, e.g., id. § 303.13; Walls, 846 A.2d at 158 (discussing standard range as a “norm” that “strongly
implies that deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts about the crime that also deviate from the
norm for the offense, or facts relating to the offender’s character or criminal history that deviates from the
norm and must be regarded as not within the guidelines contemplation”). Judges may not double-count by
using criteria considered in the guidelines to justify an aggravated or mitigated sentence. See, e.g., PA.
SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 303.13(a), Commentary, at 228 (“Any of the criteria not specifically
considered in the guidelines may continue to be used as reasons for imposing an aggravated or mitigated
sentence.”).
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compelling as for a departure sentence, the rationale for imposing an
aggravated or mitigated range sentence must be objectively defensible.291
The benefit of aggravated and mitigated ranges is that they guide the extent
to which sentences for more or less serious cases diverge from the presumptive
standard range.292 It is an example of bounded flexibility. In fact, by
providing three sentencing ranges—mitigated, presumptive standard, and
aggravated—the ISS approach further channels judges’ discretion without
extinguishing it.
Third, as discussed above, it is important to guide a judge’s decision to
impose sentences concurrently or consecutively. Providing such guidance can
reduce what might otherwise be hidden disparity.293 Roughly similar
defendants convicted of roughly similar offenses may receive wildly disparate
sentences simply by the unguided, discretionary application of the power to
sentence concurrently or consecutively.294 In the absence of any direction
291 For example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has described the justification to sentence in the
aggravated or mitigated ranges as follows:

[W]hen a case is not of the norm the sentencing judge may deviate from the standard sentencing
range. However, when sentencing in these [aggravated or mitigated] sentencing ranges, the court
is required to provide reasons on the record for so doing. Implicit in this methodology is the
premise that the court must have valid reasons for sentencing in these ranges, otherwise the
recitation of the reasons on the record would serve no real purpose.
Gause, 659 A.2d at 1017.
292 The extent of departure sentences is an often overlooked area of sentencing law. Cf. Andrew D.
Goldstein, Note, What Feeney Got Right: Why Courts of Appeals Should Review Sentencing Departures De
Novo, 113 YALE L.J. 1955, 1970 (2004) (observing that the federal “sentencing statute places few restrictions
(and provides little guidance) as to the extent of departures”). Although the focus has frequently been on the
decision whether to depart at all, the extent of the departure is vitally important. Cf. Linda Drazga Maxfield &
John H. Kramer, Two Sentencing Commission Staff Reports on Substantial Assistance, 11 FED. SENT. REP. 6,
14 (1998) (discussing that “legally irrelevant factors also appeared to have played an influential role in the
degree of a § 5K1.1 departure” for substantial assistance). Furthermore, a small, but questionably justified
departure may be viewed as less offensive than an overly large departure in a case that warrants some
deviation from the presumptive range.
293 Sadly, Pennsylvania’s guidelines, which reflect some of the attributes of the ideal ISS scheme, exert no
control over this crucial decision. They offer judges no assistance concerning when to impose concurrent
versus consecutive sentences. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has recently stated that the “imposition of
consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and does not in
and of itself even rise to the level of a substantial question” justifying appellate review. Commonwealth v.
Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citation omitted). But cf. Commonwealth v. Dodge, 859 A.2d
771, 779 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“We do not, and indeed cannot, rubber stamp all consecutively-run sentences
. . . .”); id. at 782 n.13 (“We do not read Boyer as announcing a per se rule that we never examine the
consecutive nature of a standard range sentence.”).
294 As now-Justice Breyer once noted, giving the trial judge vast discretion concerning the decision of
whether to run sentences concurrently or consecutively is problematic. “A moment’s thought suggests . . . that
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from the Commission, sentencing judges may thus functionally evade the
dictates of the guidelines. Furthermore, even the possible perception that
judges arbitrarily make decisions to run sentences concurrently or
consecutively is an unnecessary cloud over the criminal justice system. Thus,
guidance as to that decision would bring greater accountability, rationality and
perhaps legitimacy to the sentencing system.
As with the guidelines ranges themselves, judges should be free to depart
from the Commission’s guidance regarding concurrent or consecutive
sentences as long as they provide sufficient, contemporaneous justifications for
their decision. Deviations from presumptively concurrent or presumptively
consecutive sentences would be departure sentences.
Fourth, sentencing guidelines under ISS offer a fully developed departure
power. As noted above, the power to depart is crucial in a system of
presumptive sentencing guidelines. It reflects the fact that no set of rules can
anticipate every circumstance and that different cases deserve different
treatment. The departure power helps to ensure that the minimum sentence
imposed reflects the seriousness (or lack thereof) of the offense and the
culpability and circumstances of the offender while respecting the goals of
reasonable uniformity embodied by presumptive sentencing guidelines. The
judge could depart—based on judicial factfinding295 as well as jury factfinding
and defendant admissions—when there are compelling aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.296 As with the sentences in the mitigated or
aggravated ranges, the sentencing judge would have to justify the departure
sentence contemporaneously on the record.
Finally, meaningful review by appellate courts is crucial to enforce the
sentencing rules established by the Super Commission.297 Although there are

this [discretionary] approach leaves the prosecutor and the judge free to construct almost any sentence
whatsoever.” Breyer, supra note 239, at 26.
295 See supra notes 263, 265.
296 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152, 159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“[I]f a sentencing court
were able to easily sentence outside of the guideline ranges, the goals of treating like offenders in like fashion
would be frustrated and we would be, de facto, in a sentencing environment that existed prior to the passage of
the guidelines.”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
297 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smart, 564 A.2d 512, 514 (Pa. 1989) (“Appellate review of sentencing
matters would become a mockery and a sham if all sentences were routinely affirmed under the guise of
discretion of the trial court.”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ, at 216 (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2004) (describing suggested standard of appellate review as a “middle course that avoids the total absence of
enforcement and precedential decisionmaking. It sets in place a meaningful yet deferential standard for the
appellate review of sentences.”).
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several acceptable ways to organize such appellate review, it would be logical
for the intensity of the review to vary depending on the action taken by the
sentencing judge.298 For example, a sentence within the standard presumptive
range would be subject to the lowest level of review. A judge’s decision to
sentence within the mitigated or aggravated range would warrant heightened
review. Departure sentences would trigger the most searching review by the
courts of appeals.299 Even then, however, de novo review is not necessarily
required in light of the trial court’s superior ability to assess and understand the
case before it.300
This ISS approach to presumptive sentencing guidelines provides for
bounded discretion within a responsive system. The guidelines allow a judge
to judge but are sufficiently muscular to reduce unwarranted disparity and
maintain at least a medium high level of relative proportionality. For example,
the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines reflect some, though certainly not all,
of the desired features discussed above. They are more flexible than some
other presumptive sentencing guidelines, most notably the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Yet researchers have found that they reduce the unwarranted
disparity prevalent in the previous, unguided sentencing system.301
Thus, the ideal ISS sentencing system presents a workable balance between
uniformity and individualization, as reflected below:

298 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ(6), at 214–15 (describing different levels of
review for different trial court actions); id. § 7.ZZ, at 220 (“Consistent with the statutory law and caselaw in
most guideline jurisdictions, subsection (6) lays out a multi-tiered standard for appellate sentence review that
attaches with differing levels of intensity depending on the nature of the issue raised on appeal.”); Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, A New “Sliding Scale of Deference” Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District
Court Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (arguing in
favor of “a sliding scale of deference approach in which differing degrees of deference (highly deferential,
substantially deferential, moderately deferential, and non-deferential) are applied depending upon the specific
inquiry involved”). The American Law Institute proposal would also authorize “subconstitutional
proportionality review that reaches miscarriages of penalty that are not ‘reasonably proportionate’ to deserved
outcomes [in] individual cases.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ, at 220 (emphasis omitted).
299 Cf. Commonwealth v. Vega, 850 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“Sentences that fall outside
the guidelines are afforded greater circumspection . . . .”).
300 Cf. TONRY, supra note 37, at 18 (“[M]ost peoples’ judgments of others’ blameworthiness depend on
knowledge of their circumstances.”).
301 See, e.g., Joe Gorton & John L. Boies, Sentencing Guidelines and Racial Disparity Across Time:
Pennsylvania Prison Sentences in 1977, 1983, 1992, and 1993, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 37 (1999) (“[O]ur analysis
demonstrates that Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines significantly reduced, if not eliminated, racial disparity
in the prison sentences received by felony defendants.”).
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Balanced

Uniformity of
Sentences

Individualization
of Sentences

Given the interrelationship between the Super Commission, the sentencing
judge, and the appellate court, this sentencing system should rate at least a
medium high score on the proportionality confidence index.
The ideal ISS system incorporates some of the best features of presumptive
sentencing guidelines. Unfortunately, Blakely v. Washington injured or
destroyed many of these regimes. One of the most attractive parts of the ISS
method is that it allows presumptive sentencing guidelines to flourish despite
Blakely. These sentencing guidelines escape Blakely’s grasp because of ISS’s
indeterminate nature. It is thus necessary to address the resulting parole
release authority.
B. ISS Parole Release Guidelines
The ISS approach involves the joint presence of traditional presumptive
sentencing guidelines in an indeterminate system with coordinated, guided,
discretionary parole release authority. ISS offers many of the benefits of a preBlakely presumptive sentencing guidelines approach in a Blakely-compliant
fashion. The parole release power that results from this indeterminate system
is a significant and complicating limitation of the ISS model. Nevertheless, it
is possible to lessen this difficulty through a modest conception of the role of
parole release authority and comprehensive parole release guidelines.302

302 In the world before Blakely, I advocated for abolition of parole release authority in jurisdictions with
sentencing guidelines. Chanenson, supra note 43 (“Given such an approach, I do not believe that the
sentencing commission should co-exist with a separate entity that has parole release authority.”). In light of
Blakely, that position is now politically untenable. Furthermore, it would result in a less desirable sentencing
system up-front because such a system could not take advantage of the flexibility of the pre-Blakely sentencing
guidelines approach. The ISS system I now advocate assumes a reformed discretionary parole release
authority as sketched out in this Article.
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The Super Commission would recognize that because the sentencing judge
typically has superior information about the offense, the judge’s retributive
judgment—channeled by the sentencing guidelines and expressed through the
sentence imposed—is entitled to substantial weight in the parole release
process. Accordingly, ISS parole release guidelines generally encourage the
parole board to exercise its discretion303 to grant parole release at or near304 the
expiration of the typical defendant’s judicially imposed minimum sentence. In
other words, the parole release guidelines generally encourage the parole board
to mitigate the inmate’s sentence served down from the judicially imposed
maximum to the judicially imposed minimum. Yet, the guidelines do provide
for circumstances when a release after the expiration of the minimum sentence
is presumptively appropriate. Examples might include an inmate’s violation of
certain prison rules or a clear conclusion that the inmate would present an
unusually high risk if released. The amount of time served after the expiration
of the minimum sentence must be within principled limits based on the offense
and the offender, and reflect a modest view of the role of parole release
authority. The ISS parole release guidelines, like the ISS sentencing
guidelines, allow for departures when appropriate, and provide for some form
of appellate review, although this need not be judicial.
The Super Commission’s parole release guidelines will not offend Blakely.
The parole release process is outside of both Blakely’s reasoning and its Sixth
Amendment constitutional foundation. Parole release guidelines channel
discretion concerning mitigation, not aggravation. The Supreme Court has
made clear that the Sixth Amendment is not at all concerned about structuring
the judicial power to mitigate sentences.305 There should be even less concern
303 See, e.g., Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 321 (Pa. 1999) (“A prisoner has no
absolute right to be released from prison on parole upon the expiration of the prisoner’s minimum term.”)
(citation omitted); id. at 323 (finding no protected liberty interest in parole release); Commonwealth ex rel.
Sparks v. Russell, 169 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1961) (concluding that parole is a matter of legislative grace vested in the
discretion of the parole board); Commonwealth v. Reefer, 816 A.2d 1136, 1139 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(same).
The ISS scheme would survive even if the courts were to conclude that inmates had a due process
protectable expectation of parole release at the expiration of their minimum sentence. Presumably, the most
that would then be required would be the need for an opportunity to be heard and to be informed why parole
release was denied. Cf. Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). This should not be
problematic because, as noted elsewhere, I envision a transparent system in which the parole board (like
sentencing judges) explains its actions and is subject to some appellate review—perhaps administrative in
character—of the application of those parole release guidelines.
304 Such things as temporary difficulties in obtaining an approved release residence may unavoidably
prevent some inmates from being released right at the expiration of their minimum sentence.
305 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court stated that juries need not find mitigating facts:
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about the Super Commission structuring the parole board’s power to mitigate
sentences through the parole release authority. Pursuant to the ISS system, the
judge sets the maximum sentence (within the bounds set by the legislature for
the offense of conviction and authorized by the guilty verdict) long before the
parole board gets involved. Far from undercutting the jury’s role of
authorizing the greatest permissible punishment, the parole board is simply
deciding whether to mitigate the judicially imposed maximum sentence by
granting parole at some point after the expiration of the minimum sentence.
Just as Blakely-compliant sentencing guidelines can structure a judge’s power
to mitigate the length of the sentence imposed, parole release guidelines can
structure a parole board’s power to mitigate the length of the sentence served.
More fundamentally, structured parole release—as opposed to structured
sentencing—is outside the ambit of the Sixth Amendment. The very language
of the Sixth Amendment, as well as judicial interpretations concerning the
parole release process, amply supports this conclusion. It is important not to
conflate trial processes and parole release procedures.
The criminal
prosecution concludes long before the parole board determines, under a
different procedure, whether to grant an inmate discretionary parole release.
The relevant text of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury . . . .”306 Thus, the Sixth Amendment applies solely to
“criminal prosecutions” and provides rights only to “the accused.”307 No such
event and no such person are involved in the parole release process. The
criminal prosecution is over. The accused is now a convicted prisoner.
Following this understanding and the express language of the Sixth
Amendment, various courts have properly refused to analyze parole release
proceedings through the lens of the Sixth Amendment. For example, speaking
through then-Judge John Paul Stevens, the Seventh Circuit—consistent with
If facts found by a jury support a guilty verdict of murder, the judge is authorized by that jury
verdict to sentence the defendant to the maximum sentence provided by the murder statute. If the
defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for example, that he is a war veteran,
then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status is neither exposing the defendant to a deprivation
of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor is the judge
imposing upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone.
Core concerns animating the jury and burden-of-proof requirements are thus absent from such a
scheme.
530 U.S. 466, 490 n.16 (2000). The parole board’s power to release is an act of sentence mitigation.
306 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
307 Id.
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analogous Supreme Court decisions—held that a “parole release hearing is not
part of the criminal prosecution; the Sixth Amendment is inapplicable.”308
Judge Paul Cassell, in a post-Blakely opinion, stated that “parole decisions
have always been viewed as constitutionally distinct from sentencing
decisions.”309 Indeed, he wrote that “the full panoply of constitutional
protections (such as the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial) do not apply
to parole decisions.”310 Guided, discretionary parole release authority does not
offend Blakely.
Effective presumptive sentencing guidelines can survive Blakely because of
the indeterminate nature of the ISS approach. But the ISS system comes with
the difficulty of parole release authority.311 Parole release authority is
problematic for at least three reasons. First, it has a wretched history of
discretionary abuses. Second, it may be difficult to square with prevailing
theories of punishment. Third, it may presume a predictive power society

308 Ganz v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88, 89 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J.). The Ganz court quoted from a
Supreme Court case which concluded that parole revocation proceedings were not part of the criminal
prosecution. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972) (“Parole arises after the end of the
criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence.”); cf. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
364 (1998) (refusing to extend exclusionary rule “beyond the criminal trial context” to parole revocations); id.
at 369 (“We have long been averse to imposing federal requirements upon the parole systems of the States.”);
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 284 (1998) (observing that “[c]lemency proceedings are
not part of the trial—or even of the adjudicatory process. They do not determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, and are not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial process. They are conducted by
the executive branch, independent of direct appeal and collateral relief proceedings.”) (plurality opinion); id. at
289 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I believe that the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings.”) (emphasis in
original).
309 United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1264 (D. Utah 2004).
310 Id.
311 The drawbacks of discretionary parole release authority are not inconsequential. In an ideal world, I
would not advocate such a move. Before Blakely, I argued that parole release authority and sentencing
guidelines do not and should not mix. Chanenson, supra note 43; see also supra note 302. Contending that
we need to make the tough decisions at the front end, I argued that presumptive sentencing guidelines as part
of a determinate sentencing scheme, with a fully developed departure power, would more reliably lead to just
results. I also asserted that the Super Commission approach, while palatable, was second-best. Blakely
changed all that. For the reasons discussed above, a Blakely-ized presumptive guidelines system as part of a
determinate sentencing scheme is inadequate. Following the Kansas model, a jurisdiction may achieve
appropriately severe sentences by driving the discretion back underground (or perhaps just keeping it there)
through the opaque and unregulated use of concurrent and consecutive sentences. If a jurisdiction follows
Minnesota’s expected path, there will likely be pressure to increase sentences across the board in order to
allow judges to punish unusually serious permutations of an offense sufficiently. Neither of these determinate
sentencing options is desireable. Despite the complications of discretionary parole release, the ISS approach is
the most attractive post-Blakely option.
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simply does not possess. Although these concerns are substantial, ISS parole
release guidelines can resolve or at least mitigate each of them.
First, a significant objection to parole release authority is that it has
historically been an unstructured and wildly discretionary power, subject to the
same kinds of irrationalities and abuses that afflict fully discretionary judicial
sentencing. Frequently, parole release decisions were hard to predict and even
harder to explain.312 Although parole release guidelines were the forerunner of
sentencing guidelines, the move away from indeterminate sentencing and
parole release has stunted their development. Both historically and today,
some of the most powerful attacks on parole release revolve around the
problem of runaway discretion and the resulting disparities in time served by
inmates.313 This is where the power of the Super Commission is crucial.
The Super Commission is responsible for both sentencing policy and parole
release policy.314 Its parole release guidelines channel the parole board’s
discretion much in the same way as the sentencing guidelines channel the
sentencing judge’s discretion.315 The Super Commission not only brings order,
reason and transparency to the parole release process, but it coordinates both

312

As Professor Bottomley noted:
At times, parole authorities appeared to take pride in the indecipherability of their work. Even
when parole authorities did have explicit criteria and principles, this did not necessarily resolve
the problem, as they never really have clarified the process by which decisions to grant or deny
parole were made or indicated what precise weighting was given to each factor.

A. Keith Bottomley, Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments, and Prospects for
the 1990s, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH, supra note 253, at 319, 338.
313 See, e.g., HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 219 (8th ed. 2003);
Berman, supra note 57, at 26; Bottomley, supra note 312, at 338.
314 Parole release authority has recently been a problem in Pennsylvania, which employs a less-than-ideal
variation on the ISS approach. Part of the reason for the problem is that the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing has no influence over the parole release function. As I plan to explore in a forthcoming work, the
problems of uncoordinated sentencing guidelines and discretionary parole release authority are substantial.
The Utah Sentencing Commission, in contrast to Pennsylvania, provides guidance on the sentencing and
release of offenders. See Utah Sentencing Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/FAQ.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). Unfortunately, Utah uses fully
voluntary, descriptive guidelines for both sentencing and release. See id.
315 Cf. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1979) (discussing federal parole release
guidelines); Commonwealth v. Stark, 698 A.2d 1327, 1333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (describing grant of power to
parole board); Petersilia, supra note 253, at 372 (“Parole guidelines, which are used in many states, can
establish uniformity in parole decisions and objectively weigh factors known to be associated with
recidivism.”).
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sentencing and release practices. At the policy level, the entire punishment
system—from entry to exit—speaks with one voice.316
Second, some people contend that parole release authority is not justified
under prevailing theories of punishment. Parole release authority fell out of
favor with the fall of the rehabilitative ideal of punishment.317 In its place, the
goal of “just deserts” gained prominence.318 A dominant variant of that view is
the limiting retributivism theory largely attributed to Norval Morris.319
Professor Morris famously argued that desert is “an essential link between
crime and punishment. Punishment in excess of what is seen by that society at
that time as a deserved punishment is tyranny.”320
The limiting retributivism theory reminds us that our retributive judgments
are imprecise, resulting in a range of acceptable punishments supported by our
retributive beliefs. This “theory requires decision makers to select sentences
inside the boundaries of penalties that are clearly excessive and those that are
clearly too lenient, always staying within the plausible retributive range.”321 In
other words, the punishment must be deserved, or, in Morris’s term, it must be
within the range of potential punishments that are not undeserved.322 “At the
perimeters of the range, some punishments will appear clearly excessive to do
justice, and some will appear clearly too lenient—but there will nearly always
be a gray area between the two extremes.”323
Parole release authority, like sentencing authority, can operate within that
gray area. The parole board—its discretion channeled by guidelines
promulgated by the Super Commission—can act in such a way as to honor the
goals of the limiting retributivism theory. As Professor Kevin Reitz noted,
316 Cf. Bottomley, supra note 312, at 345 (objecting to having both a sentencing commission and a parole
board “both exercising decision-making responsibility over the time to be served in prison, based on a similar
set of factors that were known at the time of sentence—a sure recipe for conflict, inefficiency, or both”);
Chanenson, supra note 43.
317 See Bottomley, supra note 312, at 337 (“[W]hen the whole notion of the rehabilitative ideal began to
be challenged, parole and indeterminate sentencing were inevitable targets.”).
318 See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE
IN AMERICA 2 (2002).
319 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 4 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004); MORRIS,
supra note 21, at 76.
320 MORRIS, supra note 21, at 76.
321 Reitz, supra note 259, at 203.
322 To further determine an appropriate sentence, Morris suggested following the concept of parsimony,
which requires that the “least restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes
should be imposed.” MORRIS, supra note 21, at 59.
323 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 102.2(2) cmt. b, at 8.
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“we could choose to design a sentencing system that asks parole boards to
apply [limiting retributivism] reasoning to their cases.”324 Thus, parole boards
may exercise their discretionary parole release authority in a way that is both
guided and theoretically palatable.
In fact, consistent with limiting retributivism, parole release authority in the
ISS system can take the place of the sentence-adjusting aspects of nonflat,
determinate sentencing. Although the parole release process should not simply
be an opportunity to reweigh the seriousness of the offense or the offender’s
criminal history,325 it can be used to evaluate the defendant’s postsentencing
behavior to the extent that influences the defendant’s just punishment.326 As
Professor Reitz stated: “If it is true that parole and corrections officials
instinctively believe that the moral desert of prisoners during confinement
should have some bearing on their length of stay, we should think carefully
before attempting to legislate in the opposite direction.”327
The proposed ISS scheme requires defendants to serve their entire
judicially imposed minimum sentence. There is no good time reduction in the
minimum sentence. Yet, some correctional experts argue that improvements in
institutional behavior and order result if the inmate believes he has something

324

Cf. Reitz, supra note 259, at 203.
This is a departure from the role many parole boards have played in the past. See, e.g., DON M.
GOTTFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 23 (1978) (describing parole guidelines
model in which parole board sets severity ratings for offenses). This may have been a logical approach when
judges were sentencing as part of an unguided indeterminate model. See id. at 70 (“[T]he length of the
maximum sentence cannot be relied upon as a good indicant of the offense severity owing to the considerable
variations (disparity) in sentencing among judges.”). However, in a guided, indeterminate model with
presumptive sentencing guidelines such as the ISS approach, the judge is in the best position to make the
appropriate determinations about the seriousness of the offense or the offender’s criminal history. Cf.
Bottomley, supra note 312, at 344 (noting that the success of parole release guidelines “raises the fundamental
question whether the parole board is the most appropriate authority for determining the time to be served”)
(citation omitted). Before the judge (as opposed to the parole board) both the government and the defendant
are represented by counsel and the relevant evidence of the offense and any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances is fresh in everyone’s mind. Cf. GOTTFREDSON ET AL., supra, at 70 (discussing how at parole
release stage it “is often difficult or impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the actual behavior involved in
the offense”). Finally, a parole-based system of reweighing offense severity raises the potentially problematic
issue of how to deal with changing views of offense severity long after the offense has been committed. Cf. id.
at 80.
326 Reitz, supra note 259, at 203–04. “If there is any place for desert-based adjustments of dates of
release, they should be narrowly tailored to post-sentencing behaviors and events.” Id. at 206.
327 Id. at 205; see also id. at 208 (opposing parole release authority but noting that “where the prospects
for an offender’s rehabilitation are believed to be slim or none, the policy of incapacitation predominates and
pushes toward the longest period of confinement morally allowable”).
325
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to lose by violating prison rules.328 Even Professor Reitz, a skeptic of parole
release authority generally, is willing to accept that good time, in the
neighborhood of 20–25% of an inmate’s sentence, “is a desirable feature of a
prison system.”329 Professor Reitz noted that a “modest amount of play in
confinement terms can assist prison administrators in maintaining discipline
and can be used as an incentive to encourage inmates to participate in prison
programming, but the device should be routinized and should carry basic
protections on prisoners’ behalf.”330 Parole release authority in an ISS system
can satisfy that goal by functioning as a mechanism for what can be called
“bad time.” In other words, all of the things that could warrant the forfeiture of
good time in a nonflat, determinate system could, pursuant to transparent
parole release guidelines, justify an equally long reduction in the amount of
sentence mitigation granted by the parole board.331
There is a third argument against parole release authority. Professor Morris
and Professor Reitz, both writing before Blakely, argued that even properly
administered parole release is unwise because it offers few, if any, advantages
over a determinate system in which the judge sets the imprisonment term at
sentencing. After Blakely, the ability of the ISS approach to capitalize on the
benefits of presumptive sentencing guidelines with a fully developed departure
authority changes that calculation.
Nevertheless, there remains a strong concern that parole release authority
calls on the parole board to make impossible predictions about inmates’ future
criminal behavior and does not assist in—and in fact may discourage—
prisoner rehabilitation efforts.332 These concerns should encourage the Super
Commission to take a modest view of the role of parole release authority and
adopt a general philosophy of presumptive release at or near the expiration of
the minimum sentence. However, there is enough debate in this area to remain
open to experimentation, which can only occur within a framework that allows
discretionary parole release.

328 See, e.g., id. at 200. But see James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 217, 221, 258 (1982).
329 Reitz, supra note 259, at 200.
330 Id.
331 Cf. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 39 (indicating that institutional infractions and unwillingness to develop,
with governmental assistance, a pre-release plan could defer a parole release date); id. at 33 (distinguishing
“loss of good time for disciplinary offenses in prison” from a powerful critique against various aspects of
parole release decisionmaking).
332 See, e.g., id. at 31–45.
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Professor Morris steadfastly argued that parole release predicated on
inmate rehabilitation efforts encouraged prisoners to pretend to participate in
such programs and effectively turned prisons into acting schools.333 In part
because of the unguided and, at times, irrational discretion wielded by parole
boards, Morris believed that inmates did not trust the parole board and, in the
words of Professor Reitz, “long argued that the coercive edge of the parole
board’s release discretion actually destroys the best chances for obtaining
inmates’ genuine involvement in prison programming.”334
Professor Joan Petersilia is probably the current leading academic advocate
for parole release authority.335 She focuses in large part on the value that
parole release authority can bring to the prisoner reintegration process.336 She
asserts that “[i]nmates should be given incentives to participate in prison
programs, since research shows that regardless of their initial incentive to
become involved, some positive effects will accrue for some people.”337 While
there is a vigorous debate as to the wisdom and efficacy of her suggestions,338
Professor Petersilia contends:
Parole boards are in a position to demand participation in drug
treatment, and research shows that coerced drug treatment is as
successful in achieving abstinence as is voluntary participation.
Parole boards can also require an adequate plan for a job and
residence in the community—and that has the added benefit of
refocusing prison staff and corrections budgets on transition
339
planning.

333

Id.
See Reitz, supra note 259, at 212.
335 See PETERSILIA, supra note 63, at 74 (“Common sense and empirical evidence call for reinstating
discretionary parole release for inmates.”). But see Reitz, supra note 259, at 209 (disagreeing with Professor
Petersilia’s conclusion and recommendation but noting that she “is a respected voice in the criminal justice
research community”).
336 Petersilia, supra note 253, at 361–62 (noting that under determinate sentencing defendants are released
automatically which sets up many for likely failure and reincarceration); see also PETERSILIA, supra note 63, at
187–88 (“Eliminating discretionary release reduces the incentives for inmates to try to rehabilitate themselves
while incarcerated.”). Of course, certain re-entry programs can and should be introduced while the inmate is
incarcerated regardless of whether he is subject to a determinate or indeterminate sentence.
337 PETERSILIA, supra note 63, at 74; see also id. at 188 (“Some inmates may recognize the intrinsic value
of improving themselves, but more inmates will participate if they believe it will reduce their prison stay.”); id.
at 75 (“No one is more dangerous than a criminal who has no incentive to straighten himself out while in
prison and who returns to society without a supervised transition plan.”).
338 See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 259, at 199.
339 Petersilia, supra note 253, at 371; see also id. at 372 (“Parole officers say it is impossible to ensure
cooperation of offenders when offenders know they will be released, regardless of their willingness to comply
with certain conditions (e.g., get a job).”).
334
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Finally, and controversially,340 Professor Petersilia reports that our ability to
predict recidivism has improved in recent years, although “the ability to predict
recidivism is rather limited.”341
Contrary to Professor Petersilia, Professor Reitz is highly dubious of the
connections between parole release authority and predictions of beneficial
inmate changes.342 A full exploration of (let alone a judgment on) this debate
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is relevant to note that even
Professor Reitz believed that “we should be open to future research and should
take steps to encourage it.”343 The most effective way to examine these issues,
particularly the ability of parole release authority to encourage serious
participation in rehabilitative programs, is to have some form of parole release
authority.344 Coupled with the post-Blakely sentencing benefits of an
indeterminate system, a guided, reconceptualized, and humble approach to
parole release as part of the ISS method seems worthwhile.
Based on these ideas, an embryonic ISS parole release strategy emerges.
The Super Commission synchronizes the sentencing and parole release
policies. This is a critical component of ISS, and an approach that differs even
from many earlier efforts to rationalize parole release practices through parole
release guidelines. At least some previous attempts to create parole release
guidelines were largely disconnected from the then usually unguided, front-end
sentencing policies.345 As part of the ISS model, however, the Super

340

See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 259, at 199.
PETERSILIA, supra note 63, at 190.
342 See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 259, at 208 (describing the Canadian research on which Professor Petersilia
relies as “preliminary and only suggestive”).
343 Id. at 210; see also id. at 215–16 (“As I said earlier when the topic was prediction, this does not mean
that a hypothesized connection between release mechanisms and future behavior does not merit future study.
It does, and we may some day discover that for some categories of offenders, in some circumstances, there is
indeed a link.”); id. at 229 (“It may also be the better part of wisdom to encourage ongoing experimentation
with treatment and reentry programs fueled in part by early release incentives, provided reasonable evaluations
are performed along the way.”).
344 Parole release predicated on rehabilitative predictions can be consistent with the limiting retributivism
model. “This prospect requires a friendly amendment to Morris’s approach, borrowing from his [limiting
retributivism] framework, to posit that the exact term of confinement may be adjusted up or down within the
permissible retributive range if there is good reason to suppose that the offender’s rehabilitation will be
facilitated by a longer or shorter stay.” Id. at 211. Again, Professor Reitz does not believe that the “case has
yet been made” for a parole board’s possessing predictive power superior to that of the trial judge at
sentencing, but he notes that this “might usefully be explored in future research and in pilot programs for
specific kinds of offenders.” Id. at 212.
345 Cf. GOTTFREDSON ET AL., supra note 325, at 70 (discussing need for parole board guidelines to set
offense severity levels in part because “the length of the [judicially imposed] maximum sentence cannot be
341
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Commission provides centralized control of the sentencing guidelines and the
parole release guidelines, both of which are subject to some form of appellate
review.
The sentencing judge’s guided discretion and retributive judgment reflected
in the minimum sentence significantly inform the parole board in the exercise
of its release authority.346 This is only logical given the sentencing judge’s
typically superior information about the offense and the offender’s previous
history.347 Accordingly, the Super Commission’s parole release guidelines by
and large advise the parole board to exercise its discretion to fully mitigate the
sentence down from the imposed maximum and grant parole release at or near
the expiration of the typical defendant’s judicially imposed, minimum
sentence.348 Under the ISS parole release guidelines, not all offenders are
released at or near the expiration of their minimum sentence, but the
overwhelming majority of them will be. Nevertheless, the ISS parole release
guidelines do identify various situations that presumptively call for a later
release. As discussed above, parole release guidelines can address violations
of prison rules by reducing the extent of presumptive sentence mitigation (thus
extending the parole release date beyond the expiration of the minimum
sentence) in a principled, transparent, and predictable fashion. Furthermore,
compelling predictions of future risk, although viewed with a jaundiced eye,
may also motivate the parole board to exercise its discretion—guided by the
Super Commission’s parole release guidelines—not to mitigate down to the
minimum sentence.349 In this way, the ISS approach reduces the potential
relied upon as a good indicant of the offense severity owing to the considerable variations (disparity) in
sentencing among judges”).
346 Cf. id. at 77 (observing that even after that adoption of more traditional parole release guidelines, “[i]t
is likely that the perceived seriousness of the offense behavior for which an offender has been committed will
continue to be one of the major factors considered in parole selection decision making”).
347 Cf. id. at 70 (discussing how at parole release stage it “is often difficult or impossible to obtain an
accurate picture of the actual behavior involved in the offense”).
348 This will also make the process more predictable and allow the sentencing judge to have a reasonably
accurate understanding of the likely consequences of her minimum sentence. I plan to address some of the
sentencing problems that can flow from a dramatic lack of such parole release predictability in a forthcoming
article.
349 Cf. Reitz, supra note 259, at 208 (opposing parole release authority but noting that “where the
prospects for an offender’s rehabilitation are believed to be slim or none, the policy of incapacitation
predominates and pushes toward the longest period of confinement morally allowable”). There would also
likely be grounds for concern and a longer period of incarceration when an inmate willfully refuses to
participate in the development of a release plan. Cf. MORRIS, supra note 21, at 39 (indicating that institutional
infractions and unwillingness to develop, with governmental assistance, a prerelease plan could defer a parole
release date). As noted, there are limits to the consequences of these behaviors and the resulting risk
predictions.
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negative aspects of discretionary parole release authority,350 and the parole
release process remains compatible with the limiting retributivism model.
Like their sentencing counterparts, ISS parole release guidelines offer a
fully developed departure power. This ability to depart is vital, as it
acknowledges the fact that no set of rules can anticipate every situation and
that material differences in the offense or the offender may warrant different
treatment. The departure power helps to ensure a sensible amount of
individualization in the parole release process. It does so while simultaneously
honoring the goal of reasonable uniformity and acknowledging a modest vision
of the role and power of discretionary parole release authority. The parole
board may depart—effectively delaying parole release or advancing parole
release (up to the expiration of the minimum sentence)—when justified by
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. As with the judges and front-end
sentences, the parole board must justify the parole release departure
contemporaneously on the record.
Finally, some form of appellate review is vital to effective implementation
of the Super Commission’s parole release guidelines.351 Although the Super
Commission can monitor compliance and modify the guidelines accordingly,
there does need to be a case-specific enforcement mechanism. Consistent with
the historically flexible and informal procedures surrounding parole, this
review can be administrative instead of judicial.352 Although administrative
appellate review is a sensible choice, traditional judicial review is also
attractive and may offer enhanced perceptions of legitimacy. Appellate
judicial review is also likely to be logistically achievable given that the parole
board will release the majority of offenders at or near their minimum sentence,

Virginia presents a different, interesting, and at times arguably troubling, example of predictions at
sentencing. See, e.g., Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated
Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 165 (2004).
350 Cf. Petersilia, supra note 253, at 372 (“No one would argue for a return to the unfettered discretion that
parole boards exercised in the 1960s. That led to unwarranted disparities. Parole release decisions must be
principled and incorporate explicit standards and due process protections.”).
351 Cf. Commonwealth v. Smart, 564 A.2d 512, 514 (Pa. 1989) (“Appellate review of sentencing matters
would become a mockery and a sham if all sentences were routinely affirmed under the guise of discretion of
the trial court.”).
352 In the context of parole revocations (which implicate the arguably more serious issue of deprivation of
conditional liberty), the Supreme Court has recognized a strong governmental interest in informal
administrative procedures. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972); id. at 486 (“This
independent officer need not be a judicial officer.”).
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which limits the volume of cases for review.353 Again, like appeals concerning
the ISS sentencing guidelines, it is logical for the level of review to fluctuate
depending on the action taken by the parole board. Release decisions
departing from the Super Commission’s release guidelines are subject to more
intense review.354
By combining and coordinating presumptive sentencing guidelines and
presumptive parole release guidelines, the ISS’s Super Commission obtains
strategic control over the entire sentencing and punishment system. That
power allows rationally ordered, yet responsive, sentencing practices on the
front-end, and modest, yet meaningful, parole release practices on the backend.
CONCLUSION
Blakely may be, as Justice O’Connor has said, “a No. 10 earthquake,”355
but it need not be the end of the world. Rather, it may the beginning of
something better. It can herald the dawn of the next era of sentencing reform.
When choosing among the various ways in which to deal with Blakely,
legislatures and sentencing commissions will have to decide what kind of
accommodation they want to reach between uniformity and individualization
and how much relative proportionality they desire. Blakely-compliant options
abound. Many of these options are undesirable because they would produce
sentencing schemes that are out of kilter. Yet, a just and balanced ISS system,
compatible with Blakely, is achievable.
ISS holds great promise for the world after Blakely. There may be political
impediments to adopting this kind of a system, but the post-Blakely benefits it
brings can provide the needed push to make it possible. The ideal version of
an ISS system attempts to strike an acceptable balance between reasonable
uniformity and reasonable individualization. It endeavors to do so while
maintaining a good likelihood of reaching a proportionate result, at least in
353 Although the number of appeals will likely increase (even assuming a pre-existing ability to challenge
unguided discretionary parole release practices), this proposal need not be an unbearable burden on the courts.
Offenders will not appeal their release at (or likely even near) the expiration of the minimum sentence.
Although the government may appeal such release orders, it is unlikely to do so frequently given the general
thrust of the ISS parole release guidelines.
354 As such, the appellate process will also be able to police the release dates in an effort to ensure rough
compliance with the limiting retributivism concept.
355 Ann Gearan, Justices To Again Tackle Sentencing, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Aug. 3, 2004, at A2.
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relative terms. Any such system will always be striving to reach this ideal
balance, even with all the structural pieces in place. Professor Michael Tonry
put it well when he observed:
Like all calls for just the right amount of anything, not too much and
not too little, a proposal for sentencing standards that are constraining
enough to assure that like cases are treated alike and flexible enough
to assure that different cases are treated differently is a counsel of
unattainable perfection. Nonetheless, that is probably what most
356
people would want to see in a just system of sentencing . . . .

The ISS approach allows for a meaningful post-Blakely pursuit of that
“unattainable perfection.”
There are many potential explanations for why the Supreme Court decided
Blakely. Regardless of the reasons for its birth, Blakely has the potential to
grow into either a destructive monster or a gentle giant. The way in which the
various jurisdictions react to Blakely and its progeny will determine how
history will view these cases. Several state sentencing systems across the
country are at least partially invalid now. The Supreme Court will soon tell us
whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines survive Blakely. With what will
these systems be replaced? Legislatures need not and should not return to
classic, unguided, indeterminate—or, worse, unguided, determinate—
sentencing. Further, they need not and should not move toward a tariff system
in which every crime results in a specific, unchangeable penalty. Neither end
of the uniformity versus individualization continuum is acceptable.
Rather, legislatures, and the citizens they represent should view Blakely as
an opportunity to reassess their sentencing systems. They should seek a
balance between the extremes. Judicial “[d]iscretion should neither be
effectively absent or effectively absolute.”357 An ISS scheme offers a
productive and constitutional path. Like all sentencing systems, ISS has its
weaknesses. Yet, it avoids the lawlessness of classic, unguided, indeterminate
sentencing without becoming little more than a collection of mandatory
sentences. It honors judicial discretion without becoming its slave. It presents
a total package that offers reasonable uniformity with room for bounded
individualization and enough flexibility to provide reasonable proportionality.
ISS represents a real hope for the next era of sentencing reform.

356
357

TONRY, supra note 37, at 185–86.
Chanenson, supra note 43.
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POSTSCRIPT
As this Article was being prepared for press, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan.358 The Court produced a
fractured decision with six opinions, including two, almost dueling 5-4
majorities.359 As an (over)simplified summary, the merits majority held that
Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines360 while the remedial
majority held that the proper remedy would be to sever the allegedly
mandatory parts of the underlying legislation.361 The resulting nonmandatory
federal sentencing system still provides for appeals, but it does so under a
“reasonableness” standard of review, the contours of which are unclear.362
While courts and scholars will appropriately spill much ink over this decision
and how the new Court-imposed federal system might operate if Congress
allows it to survive,363 this decision casts no doubt on the viability of the ISS
approach. Indeed, as predicted, “[r]egardless of what the Supreme Court
decide[d] in Booker and Fanfan, Blakely presents legislatures, courts, and
sentencing commissions with an opportunity to re-examine and improve their
sentencing systems.”364 Booker and Fanfan simply guarantee that Congress
will join the many state legislatures that must decide how to reinvent their
sentencing systems. ISS continues to offer an attractive, balanced approach to
sentencing that satisfies Blakely—and now Booker and Fanfan as well—while
simultaneously being sensible, just, and grounded in sentencing history,
theory, and practice.

358

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
Compare id. at 742 (Stevens, J.) (addressing the merits), with id. at 756 (Breyer, J.) (addressing the
remedy).
360 Id. at 749.
361 Id. at 765–66.
362 Id. at 766.
363 Id. at 768 (“Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress’ court.”).
364 Supra p. 379.
359

